The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.

My point being that the categories themselves are not used consistently, so that I can be called either one or the other depending on usage.

Definitions tend to be theory bound themselves, so that mind dependent and mind independent are not clear cut. If I think that eating cows is fine, but I wouldn't if I knew more and thought longer, which represents my mind - both, neither, the first, the second?

For example, if you go to the article in La Wik on Ethical Subjectvism, they talk about "opinions" and not minds. In this case, my opinion would be that eating cows is fine, but it would not be my extrapolated values.

Some would call my position realism, and some would call it subjectivism. Me, I don't care what you call it. I recognize that my position could be called either within the bounds of normal usage.

non psycho human moral universalist.

Someone who believes that what is moral is universal across humans who are not psychos.

If I understand this right

I think you're getting the point there.

It doesn't mean that, no.

But it does mean that I ought not behave as though objective, scientific facts exist until I have some grounds for doing so, and that "some people think their intuitions reflect objective, scientific facts" doesn't qualify as a ground for doing so.

At this point, one could ask "well, OK, what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist?" and the conversation can progress in a vaguely sensible direction.

I would similarly ask (popping your metaphorical stack) "what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective moral facts exist?" and refrain from behaving as though they do until some such ground is demonstrated.