So, I think that is simply false regarding the analytic tradition, especially if we're comparing them to Less Wrong's use of specialized jargon (which is often hilariously ill-defined). I'd love to see some evidence for your claim. But that isn't the point.

There are standard introductory reference texts which structure theories of ethical semantics. They contain definitions. They don't contradict each other. And all of them will tell you what I'm telling you. Let's look, here's wikipedia. Here is the SEP on Moral Realism. Here is the SEP on Moral Anti-Realism. Here is the entry on Moral Cognitivism. All three are written by different philosophers and all use nearly identical definitions which define the moral realist as necessarily being a cognitivist. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says the same thing.

We're not talking about something that is ambiguous or borderline. Cognitivism is the first necessary feature of moral realism in the standard usage. If you are using the term "moral realist", but don't think cognitivism is part of the definition then no one can figure out what you're saying! Same goes for describing someone as an anti-realist who believes in cognitivism, that moral statments can be true and that they are mind-indpendent. All the terms after "anti-realist" in that sentence make up the entire definition of moral realism

I'm not trying to be pedantic or force you to use jargon you don't like. But if you're going to use it, why not use the terms as they are used in easily available encyclopedia articles written by prominent philosophers? Or at least redefine the terms somewhere.