At the very least, you seem to be demanding that we confuse laymen so that philosophers can understand. I happen to believe that philosophers won't understand, either.
As far as I can tell, no one understands. But I don't see how my suggestion, which involves reading maybe 2 encyclopedia articles to pick up jargon, would confuse laymen especially.
No, the right answer isn't to say "I don't know if he is a realist."
Right, it's just you explicitly called him an anti-realist. And he apparently calls himself both? You can see how I could get confused.
Actually, I do think it would be better to reject the question of realism than to equivocate, but I suspect Eliezer has tried this and found that people don't accept it.
Do people accept equivocation? I'd be fine with rejecting the question of realism so long as it was accompanied by an explanation of how it was a wrong question.
You sure you're not trying to force me to use jargon I don't like? I don't know what else to call responding to new jargon with sarcasm.
Just expressing my opinion re: design principles in the construction of jargon. I know I've been snippy with you, apologies, I haven't had enough sleep.
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: