Yes, that's true. And?
And there is a way of guides-to-action to be objectively right (etc) that has nothing to with reflecting facts or predicting experience. Thus removing the "morality doesn't help me predict experience" objection.
I'll happily endorse morality on the grounds of its reliable observable benefits,
You have presupposed that there are Good Things (benefits) in that comment, and in your previous comment about science. You are already attaching truth values to propositions about what is good or not, I don't have to argue you into that.
Same as everyone else... by following laws when I might be arrested for violating them.
"Jail is bad" has the truth-value True?
I would do all of that even if there were no objective moral facts.
Why are you avoiding jail if its badness is not a fact?
Perhaps. So what? Why should I care?
Because you care about good things, benefits and so on. You are already caring about them, so I don't have to argue you into it.
If it turns out that there really are objective moral facts that are independent of my values, and that people suffering actually is objectively preferable to people not-suffering, and my values are simply objectively wrong... why should I care?
Do you update your other opinions if they turn out to be false?
You have presupposed that there are Good Things (benefits) in that comment, and in your previous comment about science. You are already attaching truth values to propositions about what is good or not, I don't have to argue you into that.
You are treating my statements about what I value as assertions about Good Things.
If you consider those equivalent, then great... you are already treating Good as a fact about what we value, and I don't have to argue you into that.
If you don't consider them equivalent (which I suspect) then interpreting the former as ...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: