You have presupposed that there are Good Things (benefits) in that comment, and in your previous comment about science. You are already attaching truth values to propositions about what is good or not, I don't have to argue you into that.
You are treating my statements about what I value as assertions about Good Things.
If you consider those equivalent, then great... you are already treating Good as a fact about what we value, and I don't have to argue you into that.
If you don't consider them equivalent (which I suspect) then interpreting the former as a statement about the latter is at best confused, and more likely dishonest.
"Jail is bad" has the truth-value True?
I value staying out of jail.
Is there anything in your question I haven't agreed to by saying that?
If not, great. I will go on talking about what I value, and if you insist on talking about the truth-values of moral claims I will understand you as referring to what you value.
If so, what?
Why are you avoiding jail if its badness is not a fact?
Because I value staying out of jail. (Which in turn derives from other values of mine.)
Because you care about good things, benefits and so on. You are already caring about them, so I don't have to argue you into it.
As above; if this is an honest and coherent response, then great, we agree that "good things" simply refers to what we value.
Do you update your other opinions if they turn out to be false?
Sure, there are areas in which I endorse doing this.
So, you ask, shouldn't I endorse updating false moral beliefs as well?
Sure, if I anticipate observable benefits to having true moral beliefs, as I do to having true beliefs in those other areas in which I have opinions. But I don't anticipate such benefits.
Another area where I don't anticipate such benefits, and where I am similarly skeptical that the label "true beliefs" refers to anything or is worth talking about, is aesthetics. For example, sure, maybe my preference for blue over red is false, and a true aesthetic belief is that "red is more aesthetic than blue" is true. But... so what? Should I start preferring red over blue on that basis? Why on Earth would I do that?
(But Dave, you value having accurate beliefs in other areas! Why not aesthetics?)
If you consider those equivalent, then great... you are already treating Good as a fact about what we value, and I don't have to argue you into that.
I am not sure what that means. Is the "we" individual-by-individual or collective?
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
I value staying out of jail.
How does that differ from "jail is bad-for-me"?
...If not, great. I will go on talking about what I value, and if you insist on talking about the truth-values of moral claims I will understand yo
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: