If you consider those equivalent, then great... you are already treating Good as a fact about what we value, and I don't have to argue you into that.
I am not sure what that means. Is the "we" individual-by-individual or collective?
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
I value staying out of jail.
How does that differ from "jail is bad-for-me"?
If not, great. I will go on talking about what I value, and if you insist on talking about the truth-values of moral claims I will understand you as referring to what you value.
If I thought that he truth-values of moral claims refers only to what I value, I wouldn't be making much of a pitch for objectivism, would I?
As above; if this is an honest and coherent response, then great, we agree that "good things" simply refers to what we value.
Whatever that means?
Do you update your other opinions if they turn out to be false? Sure, there are areas in which I endorse doing this.
What explains the difference?
So, you ask, shouldn't I endorse updating false moral beliefs as well? Sure, if I anticipate observable benefits to having true moral beliefs,
But that isn't the function of moral beliefs: their function is to guide action. You have admitted that your behaviour is guided by jail-avoidance.
Another area where I don't anticipate such benefits, and where I am similarly skeptical that the label "true beliefs" refers to anything or is worth talking about, is aesthetics. For example, sure, maybe my preference for blue over red is false, and a true aesthetic belief is that "red is more aesthetic than blue" is true. But... so what? Should I start preferring red over blue on that basis? Why on Earth would I do that?
You seem to be interested in the meta-level question of objective aesthetics. Why is that?
Is the "we" individual-by-individual or collective?
I think that's a separate discussion, and I don't think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace "we" with "I" if that's clearer. If it's still not clear what I mean, I'm content to let it drop there.
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
I'm not sure what "giving up on values" means.
How does [I value staying out of jail] differ from "jail is bad-for-me"?
Beats me. Perhaps it doesn't.
...I
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: