Is the "we" individual-by-individual or collective?
I think that's a separate discussion, and I don't think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace "we" with "I" if that's clearer. If it's still not clear what I mean, I'm content to let it drop there.
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
I'm not sure what "giving up on values" means.
How does [I value staying out of jail] differ from "jail is bad-for-me"?
Beats me. Perhaps it doesn't.
If I thought that he truth-values of moral claims refers only to what I value, I wouldn't be making much of a pitch for objectivism, would I?
No, you wouldn't.
Whatever [what-we-value] means?
Yes.
What explains the difference [between areas where I endorse updating false opinions and those where I don't] ?
Whether concerning myself with the truth-values of the propositions expressed by opinions reliably provides observable and differential benefits.
But [observable benefits] isn't the function of moral beliefs: their function is to guide action.
I agree that beliefs guide action (this is not just true of moral beliefs).
If the sole function of moral beliefs is to guide action without reference to expected observable benefits, I don't see why I should prefer "true" moral beliefs (whatever that means) to "false" ones (whatever that means).
You have admitted that your behaviour is guided by jail-avoidance.
Yes. Which sure sounds like a benefit to me.
You seem to be interested in the meta-level question of objective aesthetics. Why is that?
I don't seem that way to myself, actually. I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
I think that's a separate discussion, and I don't think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace "we" with "I" if that's clearer. If it's still not clear what I mean, I'm content to let it drop there.
I think it is a key issue. This is about ethical objectivism. If Good is a fact about what we value collectively, in your view, then your theory is along the lines of utilitariansim, which is near enough to objectivism AFAIC. Yet you seem to disagree with me about something.
...What explains the difference [between areas w
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: