Yet you seem to disagree with me about something.
It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
What's more beneficial than doing the right thing?
I don't know. It is not clear to me what the referent of "the right thing" is when you say it, or indeed if it even has a referent, so it's hard to be sure one way or another. (Yes, I do understand that you meant that as a rhetorical question whose correct answer was "Nothing.")
If the things you think are beneficial are in fact not beneficial, then you are not getting benefits; you just mistakenly think you are.
Yes, that's true.
To actually get benefits, you have to know what is actually beneficial.
No, that's false. But my expectation of actually getting benefits increases sharply if I know what is actually beneficial.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren't observable
I disagree.
neither are the truths of mathematics.
Supposing this is true, I don't see why it's relevant.
Are you a passive observer who never acts?
No.
It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
Is ethical objectivism true, IYO?
It is not clear to me what the referent of "the right thing"
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren't observable
I disagree.
Explain how you observe the truth-value of a claim about what is beneficial.
neither are the truths of mathematics.
Supposing this is true, I don't see why it's relevant.
i...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: