It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
Is ethical objectivism true, IYO?
It is not clear to me what the referent of "the right thing"
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren't observable
I disagree.
Explain how you observe the truth-value of a claim about what is beneficial.
neither are the truths of mathematics.
Supposing this is true, I don't see why it's relevant.
it is relevant you attitude that only the observable maters in epistemology.
I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
Are you a passive observer who never acts?
No.
Then explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
Is ethical objectivism true, IYO?
If you point me at a definition of ethical objectivism you consider adequate, I'll try to answer that question.
What's more beneficial than doing the right thing?
what the referent of "the right thing"
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
So, you're asking what's more beneficial than doing things such that it's an objective fact that they are beneficial?
Presumably doing other things such that it's an objective fact that they a...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: