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Stuart_Armstrong comments on Quantum versus logical bombs - Less Wrong Discussion
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How do you see that? Most consequentialist theories would assume that "parallel universes" that you can't affect have limited impact on your choices in this one.
You could use a quantum random number generator to make your decision. Then you ensure there is an Everett branch in which humanity continues to exist, but you only pay the $5 1% (say) of the time.
That's only true if your utility function is linear. If your utility function is nonlinear, and you care about humanity existing, but you don't care as much about how much humanity exists, then a doomsday device isn't nearly as bad if you know humanity will continue to exist in a parallel universe. I assumed that this is why someone would prefer 90% of the measure of the universe being destroyed to a 90% chance of the whole thing being destroyed. Is there another reason you'd prefer the former?
There are some total utilitarians who are (or would like to be) indifferent between the two options - I've chatted with them.
If the dilemma is only taking place in a small portion of the branches, the other branches will survive regardless of the choice, which breaks the argument about many-worlds total extinction risk.
I assumed that, even if most branches don't have the machine, the machine's influence reaches to all branches, so that it can destroy all of them along with ours.
The thought experiment is about eliciting some of the normative content of truth vs. falsity of MWI, in terms that don't assume MWI. The meaning of "destroy all MWI branches" is given in terms of MWI, so this clause wouldn't respect the motivation of the thought experiment.
That is not my reading. Consider this part:
The post then goes on to argue that there is a dilemma here, that an apparently plausible case can be made for either choice, assuming that MWI is true.
I take the post to be saying, "Here's an interesting dilemma. Well, it's only interesting if there's a possibility that MWI is true. That is, if you know that MWI is false, then the answer is obvious. But, granting the possibility of MWI for the sake of argument, what would you do?"