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Adele_L comments on Open Thread, November 1 - 7, 2013 - Less Wrong Discussion

5 Post author: witzvo 02 November 2013 04:37PM

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Comment author: Adele_L 07 November 2013 08:40:26PM 1 point [-]

A fairly obvious reason is that to generate a tulpa you need to screw up you mind in a sufficiently radical fashion. And once you do that, you may not be able to unfuck it back to normal.

This is a concern I share. However...

I vaguely recall (sorry, no link) reading a post by a psychiatrist who said that creating tulpas is basically self-induced schizophrenia. I don't think schizophrenia is fun.

This is the worst argument in the world.

Comment author: Lumifer 07 November 2013 09:01:22PM -1 points [-]

This is the worst argument in the world.

I don't think so, it can be rephrased tabooing emotional words. I am not trying to attach some stigma of mental illness, I'm pointing out that tulpas are basically a self-inflicted case of what the medical profession calls dissociative identity disorder and that it has significant mental costs.

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 02 January 2014 02:47:20PM 0 points [-]

I'm pointing out that tulpas are basically a self-inflicted case of what the medical profession calls dissociative identity disorder and that it has significant mental costs.

Taylor et al. claim that although people who exhibit the illusion of independent agency do score higher than the population norm on a screening test of dissociative symptoms, the profile on the most diagnostic items is different from DID patients, and scores on the test do not predict IIA:

The writers also scored higher than general population norms on the Dissociative Experiences Scale. The mean score across all 28 items on the DES in our sample of writers was 18.52 (SO = 16.07), ranging from a minimum of 1.43 to a maximum of 42.14. This mean is significantly higher from the average DES score of 7.8 found in a general population sample of 415 [27], ((48) = 8.05, p < .001.

In fact, the writers' scores are closer to the average DES score for a sample of 61 schizophrenics (schizophrenic M = 17.7) [27]. Seven of the writers scored at or above 30, a commonly used cutoff for "normal scores" [29]. There was no difference between men's and women's overall DES scores in our sample, a finding consistent with results found in other studies of normal populations [26].

With these comparisons, our goal is to highlight the unusually high scores for our writers, not to suggest that they were psychologically unhealthy. Although scores of 30 or above are more common among people with dissociative disorders (such as Dissociative Identity Disorder), scoring in this range does not guarantee that the person has a dissociative disorder, nor does it constitute a diagnosis of a dissociative disorder [27,29]. Looking at the different subscales of the DES, it is clear that our writers deviated from the norm mainly on items related to the absorption and changeability factor of the DES. Average scores on this subscale (M = 26.22, SD = 14.45) were significantly different from scores on the two subscales that are particularly diagnostic for dissociative disorders: derealization and depersonalization subscale (At = 7.84, SD = 7.39) and the amnestic experiences subscale (M = 6.80, SD = 8.30), F(l,48) = 112.49, p < ,001. These latter two subscales did not differ from each other, F(l, 48) = ,656, p = .42. Seventeen writers scored above 30 on the absorption and changeability scale, whereas only one writer scored above 30 on the derealization and depersonalization scale and only one writer (a different participant) scored above 30 on the amnestic experiences scale.

A regression analysis using the IRI subscales (fantasy, empathic concern, perspective taking, and personal distress) and the DES subscales (absorption and changeability, arnnestic experiences, and derealization and depersonalization) to predict overall IIA was run. The overall model was not significant r^2 = .22, F(7, 41) = 1.63, p = .15. However, writers who had higher IIA scores scored higher on the fantasy suhscale of IRI, b = .333, t(48) = 2.04, p < .05 andmarginally lower on the empathic concern subscale, b = -.351, t(48) = -1.82, p < .10 (all betas are standardized). Because not all of the items on the DES are included in one of the three subscales, we also ran a regression model predicting overall IIA from the mean score across DES items. Neither the r^2 nor the standardized beta for total DES scores was significant in this analysis.

Comment author: ChristianKl 08 November 2013 03:50:59PM 0 points [-]

Could you describe the relevant mental costs that you would expect as a sideeffect of creating a tulpa?

Comment author: Lumifer 08 November 2013 04:14:46PM 0 points [-]

Loss of control over your mind.

Comment author: ChristianKl 08 November 2013 04:34:07PM 1 point [-]

What does that mean?

Comment author: Lumifer 08 November 2013 04:48:48PM 0 points [-]

An entirely literal reading of that phrase.

Comment author: ChristianKl 08 November 2013 04:50:26PM -1 points [-]

So you mean that you are something that's separate from your mind? If so, what's you and how does it control the mind?

Comment author: Lumifer 08 November 2013 05:08:23PM *  2 points [-]

Your mind is a very complicated entity. It has been suggested that looking at it as a network (or an ecology) of multiple agents is a more useful view than thinking about it as something monolithic.

In particular, your reasoning consciousness is very much not the only agent in your mind and is not the only controller. An early example of such analysis is Freud's distinction between the id, the ego, and the superego.

Usually, though, your conscious self has sufficient control in day-to-day activities. This control breaks down, for example, under severe emotional stress. Or it can be subverted (cf. problems with maintaining diets). The point is that it's not absolute and you can have more of it or less of it. People with less are often described as having "poor impulse control" but that's not the only mode. Addiction would be another example.

So what I mean here is that the part of your mind that you think of as "I", the one that does conscious reasoning, will have less control over yourself.

Comment author: ChristianKl 08 November 2013 05:12:58PM 1 point [-]

So what I mean here is that the part of your mind that you think of as "I", the one that does conscious reasoning, will have less control over yourself.

So you mean having less willpower and impulse control?

Comment author: Lumifer 08 November 2013 05:18:05PM 2 points [-]

Not only, I mean a wider loss of control.

For example someone who is having hallucinations is usually powerless to stop them. She lost control and it's not exactly an issue of willpower.

If you're scared your body dumped a lot of adrenaline in your blood and you are shaking, your hands are trembling and you can't think straight. You're on the verge of losing control and again it's not really a matter of controlling your impulses.

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