Previously: Why Neglect Big Topics.
Why was there no serious philosophical discussion of normative uncertainty until 1989, given that all the necessary ideas and tools were present at the time of Jeremy Bentham?
Why did no professional philosopher analyze I.J. Good’s important “intelligence explosion” thesis (from 19591) until 2010?
Why was reflectively consistent probabilistic metamathematics not described until 2013, given that the ideas it builds on go back at least to the 1940s?
Why did it take until 2003 for professional philosophers to begin updating causal decision theory for the age of causal Bayes nets, and until 2013 to formulate a reliabilist metatheory of rationality?
By analogy to financial market efficiency, I like to say that “theoretical discovery is fairly inefficient.” That is: there are often large, unnecessary delays in theoretical discovery.
This shouldn’t surprise us. For one thing, there aren’t necessarily large personal rewards for making theoretical progress. But it does mean that those who do care about certain kinds of theoretical progress shouldn’t necessarily think that progress will be hard. There is often low-hanging fruit to be plucked by investigators who know where to look.
Where should we look for low-hanging fruit? I’d guess that theoretical progress may be relatively easy where:
- Progress has no obvious, immediately profitable applications.
- Relatively few quality-adjusted researcher hours have been devoted to the problem.
- New tools or theoretical advances open up promising new angles of attack.
- Progress is only valuable to those with unusual views.
These guesses make sense of the abundant low-hanging fruit in much of MIRI’s theoretical research, with the glaring exception of decision theory. Our September decision theory workshop revealed plenty of low-hanging fruit, but why should that be? Decision theory is widely applied in multi-agent systems, and in philosophy it’s clear that visible progress in decision theory is one way to “make a name” for oneself and advance one’s career. Tons of quality-adjusted researcher hours have been devoted to the problem. Yes, new theoretical advances (e.g. causal Bayes nets and program equilibrium) open up promising new angles of attack, but they don’t seem necessary to much of the low-hanging fruit discovered thus far. And progress in decision theory is definitely not valuable only to those with unusual views. What gives?
Anyway, three questions:
- Do you agree about the relative inefficiency of theoretical discovery?
- What are some other signs of likely low-hanging fruit for theoretical progress?
- What’s up with decision theory having so much low-hanging fruit?
1 Good (1959) is the earliest statement of the intelligence explosion: “Once a machine is designed that is good enough… it can be put to work designing an even better machine. At this point an ”explosion“ will clearly occur; all the problems of science and technology will be handed over to machines and it will no longer be necessary for people to work. Whether this will lead to a Utopia or to the extermination of the human race will depend on how the problem is handled by the machines. The important thing will be to give them the aim of serving human beings.” The term itself, “intelligence explosion,” originates with Good (1965). Technically, artist and philosopher Stefan Themerson wrote a "philosophical analysis" of Good's intelligence explosion thesis called Special Branch, published in 1972, but by "philosophical analysis" I have in mind a more analytic, argumentative kind of philosophical analysis than is found in Themerson's literary Special Branch. ↩
Luke,
I think you are mistaken about the relative efficiency / inefficiency of scientific research. I believe that research is comparably efficient to much of industry, and that many of the things that look like inefficiencies are actually trading off small local gains for large global gains. I've come to this conclusion as the result of years of doing scientific research, where almost every promising idea I've come up with (including some that I thought quite clever) had already been explored by someone else. In fact, the typical case for when I was able to make progress was when solving the problem required a combination of tools, each of which individually was relatively rare in the field.
For instance, my paper on stochastic verification required: (i) familiarity of sum-of-squares programming; (ii) the application of supermartingale techniques from statistics; and (iii) the ability to produce relatively non-trivial convex relaxations of a difficult optimization problem. In robotics, most people are familiar with convex optimization, and at least some are familiar with sum-of-squares programming and supermartingales. In fact, at least one other person had already published a fairly similar paper but had not formulated the problem in a way that was useful for systems of practical levels of complexity, probably because they had (i) and (ii) but lacked (iii).
Of course, it is true that your point #3 ("new tools open up promising new angles of attack") often does lead to low-hanging fruit. In machine learning, often when a new tool is discovered there will be a sizable contingent of the community who devotes resources to exploring possible uses of that tool. However, I think the time-scale for this is shorter than you might imagine. I would guess that, in machine learning at least, most of the ``easy'' applications of a new tool have been exhausted within five years of its introduction. This is not to say that new applications don't trickle in, but they tend to either be esoteric or else require adapting the tool in some non-trivial way.
My impression is that MIRI believes that most of what drives what they perceive to be low-hanging fruit comes from #4 ("progress is only valuable to those with unusual views"). I think this is probably true, but not, as you probably believe, due to differing views about the intelligent explosion; I believe instead that MIRI's differing views come from a misunderstanding of the context of their research.
For instance, MIRI repeatedly brings up Paul's probabilistic metamathematics as an important piece of research progress produced by MIRI. I've mostly hedged when people ask me about this, because I do think it is an interesting result, but I feel by now that it has been oversold by MIRI. One could argue that the result is relevant to one or more of logic, philosophy, or AI, but I'll focus on the last one because it is presumably what MIRI cares about most. The standard argument in favor of this line of research is that Lob's theorem implies that purely logical systems will have difficulty reasoning about their future behavior, and that therefore it is worth asking whether a probabilistic language of thought can overcome this obstacle. But I believe this is due to a failure to think sufficiently concretely about the problem. To give two examples: first, humans seem perfectly capable of making predictions about their future behavior despite this issue, and I have yet to see an argument for why AIs should be different. Secondly, we manage to routinely prove facts about the behavior of programs (this is the field of program analysis) despite the fact that in theory this should be "undecidable". This is because the undecidability issues don't really crop up in practice. If MIRI wanted to make the case that they will crop up for a human-level AI in important ways, they should at least mention and respond to the large literature pointing in the opposite direction, and explain why those tools or their successors would be insufficient.
A full response to the misguidedness of the Lob obstacle as a problem of interest probably necessitates its own post, but hopefully this serves to at least partially illustrate my point. Another example would be decision theory of modal agents. I also won't take the time to treat this in detail, but will simply note that this work studies a form of decision theory that MIRI itself invented, and that no one else uses or studies. It should therefore perhaps be unsurprising that it is relatively easy to prove novel results about it. It would be the equivalent of an activity I did to amuse myself in high school, which was to invent new mathematical objects and then study their properties. But I think it would be mistaken to point to this as an example of inefficiency in research. (And yes, I do think the idea of formalizing decision theory in terms of code is an interesting one. I just don't think you get to point to this as an example of why research is inefficient.)
I'm not sure this is the best description of my objections to this post, but I need to start work now and it seems best to avoid keeping this around as a draft for too long, so I'm going to go ahead and post it and wait for everyone to tear it to shreds.
I understand "trade small local gains for large global gains" as a prescriptive principle, but does it work as a descriptive hypothesis? Why expect academics to be so much better than philanthropists at cause neutrality? When I speak to academics who aren't also EAs, they are basically never cause neutral, and they even joke about how ridiculously non-cause-neutral everybody in academia is, and how accidental everyone's choice of focus is, including their own.