The types of programs which have seen success in the AI revolution that is currently going on, often are not amenable to program analysis. They very often fall in the "undecidable" category, at least with respect to their anticipated behavior.
This depends which properties you care about. I suspect there isn't a small model of the AI program that duplicates its output behavior, but you can do a lot with off-the-shelf analysis.
It's relatively easy to prove things like "this program will only ever use the following subset of available system calls," or "this program is well typed", or "the program cannot modify itself", or "can only modify these fixed specific parts of its state."
I can also imagine a useful AI program where you can prove a bound on the run-time, of the form "this program will always terminate in at most X steps", for some actual fixed constant X. (Obviously you cannot do this for programs in general, but if the program only loops over its inputs for a fixed number of iterations or somesuch, you can do it.)
These sorts of properties are far from a general proof "this program is Safe", but they are non-trivial and useful properties to verify.
The FAI-related things you would want to prove are of the form: “when given a world state characterized by X, input percepts characterized by Y, the program always generates outputs characterized by Z.” For many existing and popular AI architectures, we haven't the foggiest idea how to do this. (It's no surprise that Eliezer Yudkowsky favors Pearl's causal probabilistic graph models, where such analysis is at least known to be possible.)
Previously: Why Neglect Big Topics.
Why was there no serious philosophical discussion of normative uncertainty until 1989, given that all the necessary ideas and tools were present at the time of Jeremy Bentham?
Why did no professional philosopher analyze I.J. Good’s important “intelligence explosion” thesis (from 19591) until 2010?
Why was reflectively consistent probabilistic metamathematics not described until 2013, given that the ideas it builds on go back at least to the 1940s?
Why did it take until 2003 for professional philosophers to begin updating causal decision theory for the age of causal Bayes nets, and until 2013 to formulate a reliabilist metatheory of rationality?
By analogy to financial market efficiency, I like to say that “theoretical discovery is fairly inefficient.” That is: there are often large, unnecessary delays in theoretical discovery.
This shouldn’t surprise us. For one thing, there aren’t necessarily large personal rewards for making theoretical progress. But it does mean that those who do care about certain kinds of theoretical progress shouldn’t necessarily think that progress will be hard. There is often low-hanging fruit to be plucked by investigators who know where to look.
Where should we look for low-hanging fruit? I’d guess that theoretical progress may be relatively easy where:
These guesses make sense of the abundant low-hanging fruit in much of MIRI’s theoretical research, with the glaring exception of decision theory. Our September decision theory workshop revealed plenty of low-hanging fruit, but why should that be? Decision theory is widely applied in multi-agent systems, and in philosophy it’s clear that visible progress in decision theory is one way to “make a name” for oneself and advance one’s career. Tons of quality-adjusted researcher hours have been devoted to the problem. Yes, new theoretical advances (e.g. causal Bayes nets and program equilibrium) open up promising new angles of attack, but they don’t seem necessary to much of the low-hanging fruit discovered thus far. And progress in decision theory is definitely not valuable only to those with unusual views. What gives?
Anyway, three questions:
1 Good (1959) is the earliest statement of the intelligence explosion: “Once a machine is designed that is good enough… it can be put to work designing an even better machine. At this point an ”explosion“ will clearly occur; all the problems of science and technology will be handed over to machines and it will no longer be necessary for people to work. Whether this will lead to a Utopia or to the extermination of the human race will depend on how the problem is handled by the machines. The important thing will be to give them the aim of serving human beings.” The term itself, “intelligence explosion,” originates with Good (1965). Technically, artist and philosopher Stefan Themerson wrote a "philosophical analysis" of Good's intelligence explosion thesis called Special Branch, published in 1972, but by "philosophical analysis" I have in mind a more analytic, argumentative kind of philosophical analysis than is found in Themerson's literary Special Branch. ↩