If my home is ever unsurvivably destroyed, then the sequence of events lottery win -> move away -> previous home destroyed is more likely to be what I experienced in a universe where the laws of physics contain MWI (due to Everett Immortality) than they are to be what I'd have experienced in a universe lacking MWI
Let me repeat myself: Huh?
You weren't killed in the recent tornadoes in Illinois. Is this also "evidence" for MWI?
If it is evidence for MWI, it's exteremely weak, perhaps on the order of epsilon; because in both MWI and non-MWI versions of physics, I don't have any particular reason to have predicted that I would travel to Illinois at all.
I haven't been able to find the source of the idea, but I've recently been reminded of:
This is, of course, based on the Multiple Worlds Interpretation: if the lottery has one-in-a-million odds, then for every million timelines in which you buy a lottery ticket, in one timeline you'll win it. There's a certain amount of friction - it's not a perfect wealth transfer - based on the lottery's odds. But, looked at from this perspective, the question of "should I buy a lottery ticket?" seems like it might be slightly more complicated than "it's a tax on idiots".
But I'm reminded of my current .sig: "Then again, I could be wrong." And even if this is, in fact, a valid viewpoint, it brings up further questions, such as: how can the friction be minimized, and the efficiency of the transfer be maximized? Does deliberately introducing randomness at any point in the process ensure that at least some of your MWI-selves gain a benefit, as opposed to buying a ticket after the numbers have been chosen but before they've been revealed?
How interesting can this idea be made to be?