I understand and agree with what you're saying here. I still don't understand your objections to ThrustVectoring.
Did you think he conflated consciousness and awakeness? I don't think he did, although the example he used might make you think so. The hard-problem-consciousness depends on being awake (or dreaming), so patterns of brain activity you have now correspond to hard-problem-consciousness more than patterns of brain activity you'd have if you were choked to sleep.
Nitpick: Eliezer, not Elezier.
My objection is that he's talking about the purely physical activity of the brain causing someone to write about consciousness and the 'mysterious redness of red', which is something a zombie could also do (by Chalmer's argument). Eliezer, on the other hand, is trying to explain what's wrong with Chalmers' argument. He's talking about the effect of that metaphysical 'hearer' on the world, something which Chalmers says is zero. That's also what DavidPlumpton is asking about, I think.
In Zombies! Zombies? Eliezer mentions that one aspect of consciousness is that it can causally affect the real world, e.g. cause you to say "I feel conscious right now", or result in me typing out these words.
Even if a generally accepted mechanism of consciousness has not been found yet are there any tentative explanations for this "can change world" property? Googling around I was unable to find anything (although Zombies are certainly popular).
I had an idea of how this might work, but just wanted to see if it was worth the effort of writing.