More generally (since I have no idea why we're using torture in this example and I find it distasteful to keep doing so) I'm pretty confident saying that any process that computes all and only the states of John Smith's brain during some experience X involves John experiencing X, regardless of how those states are represented and stored, and regardless of how the computation is performed.

I picked the torture example, because I'm not sure what "John experiences X" really means, once you taboo all the confusing terms about personal identity and consciousness" -- but I think the moral question is a "territory" question, not a "map" question.

The "all states and only the states of the brain" part confuses me. Suppose we do time-slicing; the computer takes turns simulating John and simulating Richard. That can't be a moral distinction. I suspect it will take some very careful phrasing to find a definition for "all states and only those states" that isn't obviously wrong.

Well, as above, I'm pretty confident that re-computing the table causes John to experience X (in addition to causing there to have been a John to experience it). I'm not confident what I want to say about the moral implications of identical recomputations of an event that has a certain moral character. My intuitions conflict.

Yah. After thinking about this for a couple of days the only firm conclusion I have is that moral intuition doesn't work in these cases. I have a slight worry that thinking too hard about these sorts of hypotheticals will damage my moral intuition for the real-world cases -- but I don't think this is anything more than a baby basilisk at most.