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solipsist comments on Continuity in Uploading - Less Wrong Discussion

7 Post author: Error 17 January 2014 10:57PM

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Comment author: solipsist 18 January 2014 12:06:36AM *  -1 points [-]

Why do you have your position on destructive uploads? It could be that when you go to sleep, you die, and a new person who thinks they're you wakes up. The world is inhabited by day-old people who are deluded by their memories and believe they've lived decades-old lives. Everyone will cease to exist as a person the next time they go to sleep.

If you believe that, I can't prove you wrong. But it's not a productive worldview.

In a world where everyone is uploaded or Star Trek transported each day, you could believe that the world is inhabited by day-old people who will cease to exist on their next transport. I couldn't prove you wrong. But it wouldn't be a productive worldview.

Comment author: Error 18 January 2014 12:30:20AM 7 points [-]

Why do you have your position on destructive uploads

Mostly by comparison to non-destructive uploads. Copy my mind to a machine non-destructively, and I still identify with meat-me. You could let machine-me run for a day, and only then kill off meat-me. I don't like that option and would be confused by someone who did. Destructive uploads feel like the limit of that case where the time interval approaches zero. As with the case outlined in the post, I don't see a crossed line where it stops being death and starts being transition.

Now that I've written that, I wish I'd thought of it before you asked; the two are really mirror images. Approach destructive uploads from the copy-then-kill side, and it feels like death. Approach them from the expand-then-contract side, and it feels like continuous identity. Yet at the midpoint between them they turn into the same operation.