You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

Ander comments on Continuity in Uploading - Less Wrong Discussion

7 Post author: Error 17 January 2014 10:57PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (87)

You are viewing a single comment's thread.

Comment author: Ander 18 January 2014 12:18:53AM *  0 points [-]

I think that your position on destructive uploads doesn't make sense, and you did a great job of showing why with your thought experiment.

The fact that you can transition yourself over time to the machine, and you still consider it 'you', and you cant actually tell at what specific line you crossed in order to become a 'machine', means that your original state (human brain) and final state (upload) are essentially the same.

Comment author: solipsist 18 January 2014 01:21:44AM *  15 points [-]

I don't like the structure of this argument. If I morph into a coffee table, I can't mark a specific line at which I become a piece of furniture. This doesn't imply that I'm essentially a coffee table. No hard boundary does not imply no transition.

Comment author: MrCogmor 18 January 2014 02:37:06AM 0 points [-]

Error isn't implying that the final state is different. Just that the destructive copy process is a form of death and the wired brain process isn't.

I get where he is coming from, a copy is distinct from the original and can have different experiences. In the destructive copy scenario a person is killed and a person is born, In the wired brain scenario the person is not copied they merely change over time and nobody dies.

My view is that if I die to make a upload (which is identical to me except for greater intelligence & other benefits) then I think the gain outweighs the loss.