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kilobug comments on Continuity in Uploading - Less Wrong Discussion

7 Post author: Error 17 January 2014 10:57PM

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Comment author: kilobug 19 January 2014 11:01:26AM -2 points [-]

But what's the difference between "non-destructive upload" and "making a copy of the upload" or "making a copy of your biological body" ?

The intuition behind "Copy my mind to a machine non-destructively, and I still identify with meat-me." is flawed and non-coherent IMHO. What if you can't even tell apart "meat you" and the other one, like the other one is put in a robotic body that looks, feels, ... exactly like the flesh body ? You fall asleep, you awake, there are two "you", one flesh the other robotic, how can you even know which is which ? Both will feel they are "real you".

There are countless similar thought experiments in which this view leads to contradictions/impossible answers. IMHO the only way to resolve them is accept that continuity of personal identity is at software level, not as hardware level.

Comment author: [deleted] 21 January 2014 08:47:09AM -1 points [-]

You are misunderstanding the argument.

Comment author: kilobug 21 January 2014 03:15:46PM -1 points [-]

More exactly I don't really understand it, because it relies on presumptions/intuitions that I don't have. My point was mostly to try to get those made more explicit so I can better understand (and then accept or refute) the argument. Sorry if that wasn't clear enough.