Carinthium comments on Skepticism about Probability - Less Wrong Discussion
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (129)
If we can have no a priori knowledge, it means skepticism wins because everything is based on faith. Given this, I try to find a means to make a priori knowledge work despite objections, both of this sort and skeptical.
If this is right, then radical skepticism wins entirely. The point is if it can be shown false on probabilities.
Yes and no. I do believe it hopeless, but I search because I'm looking anyway,
What does "skepticism wins" mean?
If what is right--that you can't be sure you're not dreaming? Of course that's right; how would you ever tell? Any method of distinguishing you came up with can't possibly be relied upon, because if you are dreaming, then that method only works in your dreamworld. In other words, it can distinguish between meta-dreams and dreams, but not between dreams and reality. (And there's no real reason to think it can even do the former, because hey, it's a dreamworld after all, and no rules apply.)
You search because you're looking? What does that mean?
Here's a question. I assume you are familiar with the probability-theoretic notion of maximum entropy. By "radical skepticism" do you mean the thesis that the only possible rational belief-state is maximum entropy?
It means we cannot be justified in knowing anything, and are isolated from any objective reality. The basic rules of probability from which we assume the reliability of memory, senses etc are taken on religious style faith.
I've been trying to find a way around this, but you are probably right.
I mean I am checking and and again just in case because I don't like the idea that scepticism is right.
I'm not familiar with that notion.
Justification depends on a function that tells you whether something is justified. I can easily justify a belief with the fact that a teacher taught it to me.
In what sense do you think it can not be justified and why do you think that framework of justification has some sort of reality to it?
Something is epistemically justified if, as you said, it has some sort of reality to it not by coincidence but because the rule reliably shows what is real. I am trying to find a framework with some sort of reality to it, and that requires dealing with scepticism.
If you don't believe in reality in the first place how could you check whether something has reality?
You need to look at reality to check whether something is real. There no way around it. Your idea for justification has no solid basis in reality if you don't believe in it in the first place.
You don't get to be certain about justification and be skeptic about reality. There are certain types of Buddhism who you could call skeptic about reality but they would also not accept the concept of justification in which you happen to believe.
I don't believe in the reality around us, not on a rational level- that does not mean I don't believe there are things which are real(there may be, anyway). I just have no idea what they are.
Justification is DEFINED in a certain manner, and I think the best one to use is the definition I have given. That is how I can be certain about justification (or at least what I am calling justification) and a skeptic about reality.
OK, let's skip to (4), as that might help you formulate your skepticism more precisely. "Maximum entropy" has more than one meaning, but here it basically means a belief-state that assigns an equal probability to all possibilities. In other words, it's the probability distribution you would use if you had zero information. For example, if I ask you whether glappzug is thuxreq or not thuxreq, you can't do better than to just pick an answer randomly. You have no clue to go on, so just get the choice over with and move on.
A thorough-going skeptic, it seems to me, would have to think that all choices are just like that one. Even when we think we have information, we don't really (because we could be dreaming!). Therefore there's no reason to discriminate between any pair of alternatives, or among any set of them.
When you say "skepticism wins," do you mean that for any set of alternative claims, there is never any reason to discriminate among them?
Probability itself being somehow valid is something I do not think rationally legitimate. Therefore, in a sense yes but in a sense no.
In that case, I don't know how to proceed until you formulate your skepticism more precisely. What exactly is it that is not justified, if "skepticism wins"?
Nothing is justified if skepticism wins. Unless we have irrational faith in at least one starting assumption (and it is irrational since we have no basis for making the assumption), it is impossible to determine anything except our lack of knowledge.
So on thought, yes. There is never any valid rational reason to discriminate between possibilities because nothing can demonstrate the Evil Demon Argument false.
OK. I am still not exactly sure what you mean by "justification." Let's put this in more concrete terms. Imagine the following:
What does the Evil Demon Argument (and all in its family) say about the rationality of each choice, compared to the others (assuming it says anything at all)?
What advice would you personally give someone sitting at such a dinner table, and why?
The Evil Demon Argument says that you don't know that it's actually those three things before you. Further, it says that you don't know that eating the rice will actually have the effects you're used to, or that your memories can be used to remember your preferences. Etc etc...
On reason, I would give no advice. On faith, I would say to have the rice.
So, which advice would you give?