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torekp comments on Identity and Death - Less Wrong Discussion

9 Post author: Tenoke 18 February 2014 11:35AM

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Comment author: torekp 19 February 2014 12:59:13AM 2 points [-]

Your comment contains an excellent point that can stand independently of Many Worlds (branching all the time). Namely, memory explains anticipation. Anticipation feels like a pointer to the next moment, but it's just an inference based on a long sequence of memories.

There is nothing wrong with anticipating a future experience, but there is also no constraint against anticipating other future experiences as well. And most of us often do; we call that "empathy". We have much more reliable history of knowing how correct/incorrect our anticipations about our own body were, though, and much less ability to ignore those outcomes. So self-concern feels different. But in some sense, self-concern is empathy for our future selves.

Comment author: cousin_it 19 February 2014 01:18:57PM *  1 point [-]

Just a nitpick, you don't need many-worlds to have branching. Even in a classical world, if it's large enough, there will be creatures with identical memories but different futures.

Comment author: torekp 19 February 2014 10:17:51PM *  0 points [-]

Right, as long as you don't require causal connection for branching. To my mind "branching" suggests a causal connection, but the OP favors a pattern identity theory, so causal connection may be irrelevant.