Once you switch to the correct epistemic framework...
You might have indicated that you want to apply another framework than implied by my reference to the simulation argument.
I might agree with yours reasoning, but need more input on this:
It is possible to demonstrate decision problems in which the optimal decision depends on whether the problem is nested in a simulation.
Once you switch to the correct epistemic framework (UDT) the argument dissolves.
Can you give me a ref for this? I don't see how it ovbiously follows.
But going back one step: Would you agree that my argument is valid in the 'wrong' framework I used?
Once you switch to the correct epistemic framework (UDT) the argument dissolves.
The best ref I could find is this
Roughly speaking, UDT says you show make decisions as if you decide for all of your copies. So, if there are copies of you inside and outside simulations, you should take all of them into account. Now, if all the copies inside simulations are located in the far future wrt the copy outside simulations (e.g. because those copies were created by a post-human civilization) you can usually disregard them because of the temporal discount in the ut...
If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.