I don't think it does. If we are not in a sim, our actions have potentially huge impact since they can affect the probability and the properties of a hypothetical expanded post-human civilization.
So: if a bet is offered that you are a sim (in some form of computronium) and it becomes possible to test that (and so decide the bet one way or another), you would bet heavily on being a sim? But on the off-chance that you are not a sim, you're going to make decisions as if you were in the real world, because those decisions (when suitably generalized across all possible light-cones) have a huge utility impact. Is that right?
The problem I have is this only works if your utility function is very impartial (it is dominated by "pro bono universo" terms, rather than "what's in it for me" or "what's in it for us" terms). Imagine for instance that you work really hard to ensure a positive singularity, and succeed. You create a friendly AI, it starts spreading, and gathering huge amounts of computational resources... and then our simulation runs out of memory, crashes, and gets switched off. This doesn't sound like it is a good idea "for us" does it?
This all seems to be part of a general problem with asking UDT to model selfish (or self-interested) preferences. Perhaps it can't. In which case UDT might be a great decision theory for saints, but not for regular human beings. And so we might not want to program UDT into our AI in case that AI thinks it's a good idea to risk crashing our simulation (and killing us all in the process).
In UDT it doesn't make sense to speak of what "actually exists". Everything exists, you just assign different weights to different parts of "everything" when computing utility.
I've remarked elsewhere that UDT works best against a background of modal realism, and that's essentially what you've said here. But here's something for you to ponder. What if modal realism is wrong? What if there is, in fact, evidence that it is wrong, because the world as we see it is not what we should expect to see if it was right? Isn't it maybe a good idea to then - er - update on that evidence?
Or does a UDT agent have to stay dogmatically committed to modal realism in the face of whatever it sees? That doesn't seem very rational does it?
So: if a bet is offered that you are a sim (in some form of computronium) and it becomes possible to test that (and so decide the bet one way or another), you would bet heavily on being a sim?
It depends on the stakes of the best.
But on the off-chance that you are not a sim, you're going to make decisions as if you were in the real world, because those decisions (when suitably generalized across all possible light-cones) have a huge utility impact. Is that right?
It's not an "off-chance". It is meaningless to speak of the "chance I am a...
The 'Irrationality Game' posts in discussion came before my time here, but I had a very good time reading the bits written in the comments section. I also had a number of thoughts I would've liked to post and get feedback on, but I knew that being buried in such old threads not much would come of it. So I asked around and feedback from people has suggested that they would be open to a reboot!
I hereby again quote the original rules:
I would suggest placing *related* propositions in the same comment, but wildly different ones might deserve separate comments for keeping threads separate.
Make sure you put "Irrationality Game" as the first two words of a post containing a proposition to be voted upon in the game's format.
Here we go!
EDIT: It was pointed out in the meta-thread below that this could be done with polls rather than karma so as to discourage playing-to-win and getting around the hiding of downvoted comments. If anyone resurrects this game in the future, please do so under that system If you wish to test a poll format in this thread feel free to do so, but continue voting as normal for those that are not in poll format.