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The latter. The objection that I described is known as "tickle defense of EDT".
Keep in mind that EDT is defined formally, and informal scenarios typically have implicit assumptions of probabilistic conditional independence which affect the result.
By making these assumption explicit, it is possible to have EDT smoke or not smoke in the smoking lesion problem, and two-box or one-box in Newcomb's problem.
In fact the smoking lesion problem and Newcomb's problem are two instances of the same type of decision problem, but their presentations may yield different implicit assumptions: in the smoking lesion problem virtually anybody makes assumptions such that smoking is intuitively the optimal choice, in Newcomb's problem there is no consensus over the optimal choice.
OK, thanks. Though if that's indeed the "proper" version of EDT, then I no longer understand the conflict between EDT and CDT. Do you know any problem where EDT+tickle disagrees with CDT?
CDT essentially always chooses two-box/smoke in Newcomb-like problems, in EDT, the choice depends on the specific formalization of the problem.