This would count toward my major, and if I weren't going to take it, the likely replacement would be a course in experimental/"folk" philosophy. But I'd also like to hear your thoughts on the virtues of academic rationality courses in general.
(The main counterargument, I'd imagine, is that the Sequences cover most of the same material in a more fluid and comprehensible fashion.)
Here is the syllabus: http://www.yale.edu/darwall/PHIL+333+Syllabus.pdf
Other information: I sampled one lecture for the course last year. It was a noncommital discussion of Newcomb's problem, which I found somewhat interesting despite having read most of the LW material on the subject.
When I asked what Omega would do if we activated a random number generator with a 50.01% chance of one-boxing us, the professors didn't dismiss the question as irrelevant, but they also didn't offer any particular answer.
I help run a rationality meetup at Yale, and this seems like a good place to meet interested students. On the other hand, I could just as easily leave flyers around before the class begins.
Related question: Could someone quickly sum up what might be meant by the "feminist critique" of rationality, as would be discussed in the course? I've read a few abstracts, but I'm still not sure I know the most important points of these critiques.
I did have this sort of thing in mind. My claim was that I think it also goes deeper. This article (PM me your email address if you don't have access to the PDF) splits the criticism into three primary schools, the first of which begins with the content of scientific theories (i.e. racism, sexism, class bias) and from that concludes that rationality is wrong. An excerpt:
If I'm reading that paragraph right, that's attributed to Luce Irigaray's 1987 paper.
The second school criticizes the methodology and philosophy of science, and then the third criticizes the funding sources (and the implied methodology) of modern science. The author argues that each has serious weaknesses, and that we need to build a better science to incorporate the critiques (with a handful of practical suggestions along those lines) but that the fundamental project of science as a communal endeavor is sound. Since I think the author of that paper is close to my camp, it may be prudent to follow her references and ensure her interpretation of them is fair.