adamzerner comments on What do rationalists think about the afterlife? - Less Wrong Discussion
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The reason for thinking that consciousness is a physical process of the brain is the remarkable correspondence we find between injuries to the brain or the introduction of various chemicals, and variations of conscious experience. That leaves open the possibility that consciousness is a physically separate entity for which the brain is the interface through which it moves the body and receives sensation from it, rather than brain processes themselves being consciousness. However most of the ground for that is undercut by the fact that some brain injuries severing parts of the brain from each other also appear to sever the corresponding parts of consciousness -- split-brain observations. It seems that it is not only components of consciousness that correspond to brain regions, but also their interconnection. The more we find out, the less role is left for the hypothesis of a separate consciousness to do any work. Like the old "God in the gaps" argument to defend theism against science.
That is the argument, but it is important to note what it does not solve. It does not solve the problem of what consciousness is -- of why there is any such thing in the world as experience, and how any physical process could produce it. Nobody knows the answer to that. (ETA: including non-materialists. "There are souls" is not an explanation of how they work.) In this it differs from the problem of God. There may be people who claim a direct experience of God in the same way as they have direct experience of themselves, but it does not seem to be common. Experience of one's own presence, on the other hand, is reported by almost everyone. Yet everything else we know about the world tells us that there cannot possibly be any such thing. We cannot even see what an explanation for experience would be.
There are those who point to some physical phenomenon that is present whenever consciousness is, and conclude, "that's consciousness". Unless they show how whatever it is produces experience, they have not explained consciousness. Most proposed solutions are of this form.
There are those who point to some more or less speculative physical process (e.g. quantum gravity in the microtubules) and assert, "that's consciousness". Unless they show how whatever it is would produce experience, they have not even speculatively explained consciousness.
There are those who take the apparently impossible magnitude of the problem as an argument that there is no problem, which is like a student demanding full marks because the exam was too hard.
There are those who claim to have realised that in fact they have no consciousness and never did (Buddhist enlightenment is often so described, and I believe that the psychologist Susan Blackmore has said something like this, but I can't find a cite). If they carry on functioning like ordinary people then they are claiming to be p-zombies, and if they don't, they've philosophised a tamping iron into their brain.
As for myself, I simply note the evidence above, the problem it leaves unsolved, and my lack of any idea for a solution. Yet it seems that few people can do that. Instead, as soon as they start thinking about the problem, they frantically cast about for solutions and latch onto something of one of the above forms. The problem is like a piece of grit in an oyster, provoking it to encyst it in layer upon layer of baroque encrustations that merely hide the problem instead of solving it.
We have as much reason to reject them as we have to reject the existence of a slice of chocolate cake in the asteroid belt.
Yes, this is a regrettably frequent error on this question.
I agree with everything you said, except for the Devils Advocate part.
It's not an argument against against my claim. It's just saying "don't play Devils Advocate for fun, only do it to help you find truth". I'm definitely not playing Devils Advocate for fun, I'm trying to arrive at the truth.
I'm not confident in my belief that "we don't know whether or not we'll remain conscious after we die". I'm more confident in it than the alternative, so it's the belief I'll go with for now, but I'm exploring whether or not it's true, which is why I posted here.
Anyway, consider the possibility that we remain conscious after we die, but can't communicate this consciousness to the living (if it helps to be more concrete, let's say that consciousness resides on some super small physical level that is uninterrupted when we die). We have no data on whether or not this possibility is true. We aren't aware of any preconditions that lead to it, and we aren't aware of any preconditions that don't lead to it (the correlation between the brain and consciousness is a correlation between the brain and consciousness that can be communicated). I know it seems crazy (and my inner voice sort of tells me that it's crazy), but I think that this means that my model of the world should give it a 50/50 shot at happening.
I've thought about it a lot, and I think the reason it feels weird to say that is because we're so used to dealing with things for which we do have information about. I think the instinctive thing to do is to query our minds for data that could support or reject this possibility, and our mind returns data on a similar possibility: consciousness that we can communicate. Another thing: I think it's tempting to reverse stupidity. To say "people who believe in the afterlife are clearly wrong; there isn't any afterlife". I'm still confused so I apologize for this paragraph being jumbled. I'm basically just saying that these are things to maybe be weary of.
I'd really like to get your thoughts on this after considering my argument again and giving it an honest chance (that we have no data on what does or doesn't lead to the state of "being conscious after you die but being incapable of communicating it to living people"). I definitely wouldn't be surprised if I made a mistake in my reasoning and I would really love to know what it is if I'm making one.
Sorry, I wasn't intending to make a reference to Devil's advocacy with that link, but to the question of whether it is reasonable to claim that there could be a slice of chocolate cake in the asteroid belt. It is true that we can't observe the asteroid belt well enough to tell directly, but the world has patterns, and what we know of those patterns, tested by the observations that we have made, rules out the chocolate cake hypothesis. We don't, indeed can't, say, "how can we know?" and give it 50% probability.
Our observations of the connections between brain states and consciousness also don't leave much room for disembodied existence. Personally, I wouldn't say it's as well established as the nonexistence of asteroidal chocolate cake, but I put souls, ghosts, and other spirits a long way below the 50% of maximum ignorance.
Any ghosts out there reading this? Show yourselves, don't just give a few people spooky chills!
1) Regarding connection we see between brain states and consciousness, how do we know that people are really "unconscious"? What if they're still experiencing and feeling things, but are just incapable of communicating this to us at the time, and are incapable of remembering it? Sort of like how when we are asleep and dreaming we're conscious but we could only confirm this is we wake up at the right time (actually, I'm not sure if this is actually true).
2) Assuming that the connection between brain states and consciousness is legit, then I think you're right. After thinking about it some more, I think the point you make below means it'd be much less than a 50/50 chance.
We have all this data that says "mess the brain up, and you mess consciousness up". It's possible that there is some underlying thing that represents consciousness, but we have data that says that this thing is messed up when you mess the brain up. It'd be crazy if your brain happens to be messed up in such a way when you die that it leaves the thing underlying consciousness in tact.
But as far as overall likelihood of consciousness remaining, it depends on 1). Could we really say that brain states correlate with unconsciousness? How can we determine unconsciousness?
A hypothesis thus described is untestable. Moreover, it's inconsequential: the observed result is the same regardless of whether the hypothesis is true or not. In such a case, the hypothesis can be safely ignored because it adds nothing to our models.
1) Untestable doesn't mean wrong.
2) What about the possibility that we just can't do a good job of measuring peoples' consciousness given our level of technology?