= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
shminux comments on What should a Bayesian do given probability of proving X vs. of disproving X? - Less Wrong Discussion
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (19)
Not a great example. "But if one could prove that the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, that would constitute a disproof of X." -- where X is free will? Probably not by many definitions of it.
In general, I don't see how this question is different from "what a Bayesian should do" with any other probabilistic statement.
One of the ways in which it is different is that it is dealing with logical uncertainty, which has not yet received a conclusive formulation, as far as I'm aware.
ETA: Actually, I misread the OP. It talks about whether X will be proven, not whether it can be proven. So it's not logical uncertainty. Retracting.