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RichardKennaway comments on What should a Bayesian do given probability of proving X vs. of disproving X? - Less Wrong Discussion
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Except that the example he gives is not a mathematical one, but the question of free will. I have to wonder if the question of free will is not the real subject of the post.
No; free will was the question that got me thinking about it. It seems to me at first glance that the existence of free will could be disproven, but couldn't be proven. Should that impact my belief in it?
(Short answer: No, because the payoff matrix for believing and not believing in free will is peculiar. But that peculiar case doesn't affect the question I'm asking here. The free will question itself is not interesting to me.)