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Luke_A_Somers comments on What should a Bayesian do given probability of proving X vs. of disproving X? - Less Wrong Discussion

0 Post author: PhilGoetz 07 June 2014 06:40PM

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Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 10 June 2014 03:09:39PM 2 points [-]

If so, consider X = "free will exists". One could argue that the term "free will" is defined such that it is impossible to detect it, or to prove that it exists. But if one could prove that the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, that would constitute a disproof of X. Then P(willbeproven(X)) / (P(willbeproven(X)) + P(willbedisproven(X))) = 0.

This has to be one of the worst examples I've ever seen that wasn't actively trying to push an agenda.

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