People sometimes say that it doesn't really matter whether things like MWI are true (as opposed to the Copenhagen interpretation), since knowing whether it is correct or not wouldn't affect your decision-making unless you are willing to kill yourself. I've been trying to come up with a scenario where you can exploit that knowledge without actually killing yourself and this is where I am at so far:

1. Say for the sake of argument that in a nuclear war big cities like London or New York have a much better chance of being nuked versus Sitka, Alaska or Swansea, Wales.

2. Furthermore, let's say that you prefer being alive in a world where the Earth isn't half-destroyed by a nuclear war versus one where it is.

3. Additionally, let's say that you know MWI is correct in this scenario.

4. Under this paradigm If you live in London/New York you will be less likely to find yourself in a world where a nuclear war has erupted, as you will likely be dead in those worlds. However, if you live in Sitka/Swansea, you are more likely to survive some nuclear wars (as London/New York would be destroyed in more wars) and it is thus more likely to end up in a world where such an event has occurred.

5. By combining 1-4, if you have a choice between living in Sitka versus living in New York, everything else being equal, you should choose New York to decrease the probability of waking up in a post-apocalyptic world.

Alternative scenario under the same paradigm for LessWrogners - if you don't want to live in a world where FAI research stagnates, you might want to move to the Bay Area, so you can decrease the probability, that you'll end up in a world where most of MIRI and friends are all dead. (yeah, I know - finally a reason for rationalists to move to the Bay Area)