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asr comments on Against utility functions - Less Wrong Discussion
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I think part of Eliezer's point was also to introduce decision theory as an ideal for human rationality. (See http://lesswrong.com/lw/my/the_allais_paradox/ for example.) Without talking about utility functions, we can't talk about expected utility maximization, so we can't define what it means to be ideally rational in the instrumental sense (and we also can't justify Bayesian epistemology based on decision theory).
So I agree with the problem stated here, but "let's stop talking about utility functions" can't be the right solution. Instead we need to emphasize more that having the wrong values is often worse than being irrational, so until we know how to obtain or derive utility functions that aren't wrong, we shouldn't try to act as if we have utility functions.
I like this explanation of why utility-maximization matters for Eliezer's overarching argument. I hadn't noticed that before.
But it seems like utility functions are an unnecessarily strong assumption here. If I understand right, expected utility maximization and related theorems imply that if you have a complete preference over outcomes, and have probabilities that tell you how decisions influence outcomes, you have implicit preferences over decisions.
But even if you have only partial information about outcomes and partial preferences, you still have some induced ordering of the possible actions. We lose the ability to show that there is always an optimal 'rational' decision, but we can still talk about instances of irrational decision-making.