Philosophers aren't actually ignorant of computational theories of mind. Some of them reject CTM , because it seems have no more ability address qualia/hard problem issues than materialism ( in fact, one can robustly argue that compuationalism doesn't add anything to materialism in terms of powers or properties, and that CTM is therefore less able to explain qualia than straight materialism).

So, before LW starts shouting about the stupidity of philosophers, LW needs to say something about the Hard Problem.

At the moment there isn't even a consensus.

Eta: having re-read Fodors review, I notice there are frequent references to the hard problem issues, qualia than, conscious experience, etc. I am not sure whether Eli thinks they're unimportant, or thinks the CTM explains them , or what.

panpsychism is bunk.

Panpsychism is the least defensible of a set of related concepts.