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Punoxysm comments on A Parable of Elites and Takeoffs - Less Wrong Discussion
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I think you actually illustrate how correct I am. When there's uncertainty about how sincere a threat is, especially because virtually all threats of military action are negative value for both parties if executed, and when the threat sets a precedent that the threatening party could continually impose its will, it's natural to test the threatening parties commitment.
All you're saying is that Saddam called the USA's bluff and was wrong and it was disastrous. That could EASILY have happened with an attempt by the US to demand inspections from Russia.
Think about it further: you are threatened by a nation with a newly developed super-weapon, but only modest stockpiles and uncertain ability to deliver it, to not develop your own version of the super-weapon. The demand is that you submit to thorough inspections, which your enemy would certainly use to spy as extensively as possible on you.
Not to mention that it would set a precedent where you'd have to back down for the next demand, and the next; anythings' better than being a smear of ash after all, isn't it?
Or you could consider your excellent military position right next to your enemy's allies, along with the amount of safety provided by a combination of secrecy and bunkers, and decide that the best move - the only move if you want to resist the slide towards subjugation - is to call your enemy's bluff.
Um, no, because the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs that were best ridden out lest it damage both allies' long-term goals.
I'm amazed. You present an example which you think is a great example of irrationality on a dictator's part, I show you are wrong and have no idea why Saddam resisted and you think you can spin it to support your claims and it actually illustrates how correct you are! What could possibly falsify your criticisms?
How well did that work in the Cold War against non-nuclear nations..? Everyone understands the logic of blackmail and the point of using Schelling fences to avoid sliding down the slippery slope.
And likely lose, with no superweapon of your own, no prospect of developing it soon under the chaos of war (it was already a top-priority program for Stalin, war could only have delayed it), being cutoff from one of one's most important trading partners which kept one from economic collapse during WWII, and a self-centered psychopath like Stalin would have to worry about how well bunkers would really protect him against weapons they have no direct experience with and which were increasing in tonnage each year.
Do you mean "Iraq", rather than "USSR"?
I don't think Punoxysm is saying that it's an example of irrationality. Punoxysm is saying that it's a reasonable reaction, and it shows that calling the bluff would also be a reasonable response in Stalin's case. You haven't shown that Punoxysm is wrong, you've argued that Punoxysm is wrong.
I think the answer to that is rather obvious. If Hussein had allowed the inspections, that would support your position. It's rather odd to be calling someone's position unfalsifiable, simply because they are not accepting your explanations for why evidence falsifying your position is unpersuasive.
No, I meant USSR. Iraq was in a special position of being both a former close US ally and still in the valuable-to-the-US geopolitical position which made it an ally in the first place, and that is why Saddam engaged in the reasoning he did. The USSR was a former close US ally, yes, but played no such valuable role and both recognized each other as their principal threat after the Nazis were defeated.
I don't know how I can point out he's wrong any more clearly. Saddam had good reason to think the threats were bluffs. Stalin would not have because those reasons did not apply to the USSR. The situations are not the same.
Yes, but we already know he didn't. So the question is his motivations; Punoxysm has asserted that if he did it for irrational reasons, then it supports his criticism, and when I pointed out that he did it for rational reasons, he then did it supported his position! So why did he not say in the first place simply, 'Saddam didn't allow inspections; this is evidence the strategy cannot work'? Obviously, because he felt the irrational qualifier was necessary right up until I produced the references. (It is a basic principal of natural language that you do not use unnecessary restrictions or qualifiers when they are not relevant.)
So, just to be clear: you believe that in the hypothetical world in which the US threatens to attack the USSR if it does not allow inspections, the USSR would have no reason to think this serves a useful purpose, and would be therefore justified in concluding it was a bluff?
You are saying that there are reasons for thinking it was a bluff that did not apply to the USSR. That's denying the antecedent.
It's not clear to me what you're referring to.