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Kaj_Sotala comments on Expected utility, unlosing agents, and Pascal's mugging - Less Wrong Discussion

19 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 28 July 2014 06:05PM

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Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 29 July 2014 09:07:20AM *  4 points [-]

(I liked your post, but here's a sidenote...)

It bothers me that we keep talking about preferences without actually knowing what they are. I mean yes, in the VNM formulation a preference is something that causes you to choose one of two options, but we also know that to be insufficient as a definition. Humans have lots of different reasons for why they might choose A over B, and we'd need to know the exact reasons for each choice if we wanted to declare some choices as "losing" and some as "not losing". To use Eliezer's paraphrase, maybe the person in question really likes riding a taxi between those locations, and couldn't in fact use their money in any better way.

The natural objection to this is that in that case, the person isn't "really" optimizing for their location and being irrational about it, but is rather optimizing for spending a lot of time in the taxi and being rational about it. But 1) human brains are messy enough that it's unclear whether this distinction actually cuts reality at the joints; and 2) "you have to look deeper than just their actions in order to tell whether they're behaving rationally or not" was my very point.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 29 July 2014 09:39:43AM 2 points [-]

Valid point, but do let me take babysteps away from vNM and see where that leads, rather than solving the whole preference issue immediately :-)

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 29 July 2014 02:33:04PM 3 points [-]

That's reasonable. :-)