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Creutzer comments on Open thread, July 28 - August 3, 2014 - Less Wrong Discussion

5 Post author: polymathwannabe 28 July 2014 08:27PM

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Comment author: pianoforte611 29 July 2014 12:21:11AM *  33 points [-]

but we had entirely different background assumptions about how one makes a case for said position. There was a near-Kuhnian incommensurability between us.

This is very frustrating and when I realize it is happening, I stop the engagement. In my experience, rationalists are not that different from smart science or philosophy types because we agree on very basic things like the structure of an argument and the probabilistic nature of evidence. But in my experience normal people are very difficult to have productive discussions with. Some glaring things that I notice happening are:

a) Different definitions of evidence. The Bayesian definition of evidence is anything that makes A more likely than not A. But for many people, evidence is anything that would happen given A. For example a conspiracy theorist might say "Well of course they would deny it if were true, this only proves that I'm right".

b) Aristotelianism: the idea that every statement is either true or false and you can prove statements deductively via reasoning. If you've reasoned that something is true, then you've proved it so it must be true. Here is a gem from an Aristotelian friend of mine "The people in the US are big, it must be the food and they use growth hormones in livestock, therefore people in the US are big because of growth hormones".

c) Arguments that aren't actually arguments. Usually these are either insults or signals of tribal affiliation. For example "Good to know you're better than everyone else" in response to a critical comment. But insults can be more subtle and they can masquerade as arguments. For example in response to a call for higher taxes someone might say "If you love taxes so much then why aren't you sending extra money to the treasury?".

d) Arguments that just have nothing to do with their conclusion. An institute called Heartmath stated this gem (rough paraphrase): "The heart sends more information to the brain than the brain does to the heart therefore the heart is more important that the brain".

e) Statistical illiteracy. I want to grab a flamethrower every time the following exchange happens:

Salviati: "According to this study people who are X tend to be Y"

Simplicio: "Well I know someone who is X but isn't Y, so there goes that theory"

f) Logical illiteracy:

Example 1:

Salviati: " If A then B"

Simplicio: "But A isn't true therefore your argument is invalid"

Example 2:

Simplicio: "X is A therefore X is B"

Salviati: "Let us apply a proof by contradiction. 'A implies B' is false because Y is A, but Y is not B"

Simplicio: "How dare you compare X to Y, they are totally different! Y is only not B because ..."

Sorry if the symbolic statements are harder to read, I didn't want to use too many object level issues.

Comment author: Creutzer 29 July 2014 04:05:26AM *  2 points [-]

f) Logical illiteracy:

Example 1:

Salviati: " If A then B"

Simplicio: "But A isn't true therefore your argument is invalid"

Sorry for being nit-picky, but that is partly linguistic illiteracy on Salviati's part. Natural language conditionals are not assertible if their antecedent is false. Thus, by asserting "If A then B", he implies that A is possible, with which Simiplicio might reasonably disagree.

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 29 July 2014 09:37:43PM *  2 points [-]

It depends why Salvati is bringing it up.

"If X(t), then A(t+delta). If A(t') then B(t'+delta')."

"But, not A(now)!"

Comment author: Creutzer 30 July 2014 05:10:28AM 1 point [-]

Even with such a generic conditional (where t and t' are, effectively, universally quantified), the response can make sense with the following implied point: So not "B(now+delta')", hence we can't draw any presently relevant conclusions from your statement, so why are you saying this?

It may or may not be appropriate to dispute the relevance of the conditional in this way, depending on the conversational situation.

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 30 July 2014 03:00:24PM 3 points [-]

Let me rephrase that with more words:

"If we do X, then A will happen. If A happens, then B happens."

"But A isn't happening."

Comment author: sediment 29 July 2014 10:24:33AM 2 points [-]

Can you give a quick example with the blanks filled in? I'm interested, but I'm not sure I follow.

Comment author: Creutzer 29 July 2014 07:41:13PM *  3 points [-]

A: If John comes to the party, Mary will be happy. (So there is a chance that Mary will be happy.)

B: But John isn't going to the party. (So your argument is invalid.)

Comment author: [deleted] 30 July 2014 11:55:47AM 1 point [-]

That's what the subjunctive is for. If A had said “If Jon came to the party, Mary would be happy”, ...

Comment author: Creutzer 01 August 2014 06:17:17AM 1 point [-]

The same thing can still happen with a subjunctive conditional, though.

A: If John came to the party, Mary would be happy. (So we could make Mary happy by making John come to the party.) B: But John isn't going to the party, no matter what we do. (So your argument is invalid.)

Also, pace George R. R. Martin, the name is still spelled John. Sorry, no offense, I just couldn't resist. :)

Comment author: gjm 02 August 2014 09:15:53PM 4 points [-]

Jon -- short for Jonathan -- was a perfectly good name long before George R R Martin.

Comment author: Creutzer 03 August 2014 06:41:52AM 2 points [-]

Ah, thanks. I didn't know that existed as a short form for Jonathan, and inferred that it was merely another instance of his distorting English spelling in names and titles.

Comment author: pianoforte611 29 July 2014 11:36:59AM 1 point [-]

Usually in these exchanges the truth value of A is under dispute. But it is nevertheless possible to make arguments with uncertain premises to see if the argument actually succeeds given its premises.

"But A isn't true" is also a common response to counterfactual conditionals - especially in thought experiments.

Comment author: fubarobfusco 30 July 2014 05:39:52PM 2 points [-]

Well, sometimes thought-experiments are dirty tricks and merit having their premises dismissed.

"If X, Y, and Z were all true, wouldn't that mean we should kill all the coders?"
"Well, hypothetically, but none of X, Y, and Z are true."
"Aha! So you concede that there are certain circumstances under which we should kill all the coders!"

My preferred answer being:

"I can't occupy the epistemic state that you suggest — namely, knowing that X, Y, and Z are true with sufficient confidence to kill all the coders. If I ended up believing X, Y, and Z, it's more likely that I'd hallucinated the evidence or been fooled than that killing all the coders is actually a good idea. Therefore, regardless of whether X, Y, and Z seem true to me, I can't conclude that we should kill all the coders."

But that's a lot more subtle than the thought-experiment, and probably constitutes fucking tedious in a lot of social contexts. The simplified version "But killing is wrong, and we shouldn't do wrong things!" is alas not terribly convincing to people who don't agree with the premise already.

Comment author: RichardKennaway 08 August 2014 09:59:14PM 0 points [-]

The simplified version "But killing is wrong, and we shouldn't do wrong things!" is alas not terribly convincing to people who don't agree with the premise already.

There are other ways of saying it. I think Iain Banks said it pretty well.