That is my point, its not and therefore can't pass the conscious language test and I think thats quite the problem.
I think the Vaidman procedure doesn't make consciousness present because the specific input and output being only a yes or no answer makes it no better than the computers we are using right now. I can ask SIRI yes or no answers and get something out but we can agree that Siri is an extremely simple kind of consciousness embodied in computer code built at Apple to work as an assistant in iPhones. If the Vaidman brain were to be conscious I should be able to ask it a "question" without definable bounds and get any answer between "42" and "I don't know or I cannot answer that." So for example, you can ask me all these questions and I can work to create an answer as I am now doing or I could simply say "I don't know" or "my head is parrot your post is invalid." The answer would exist as a signpost of my consciousness although it might be unsatisfying. The Vaidman brain could not work under these conditions because the bounds are set. Any time you have set bounds saying that it is apriori consciousness is impossible.
That is my point [...]
Then I have no idea what you meant by "If you use the language test then yes and FHE encrypted sm with a lost key is still conscious".
the specific input and output being only a yes or no answer makes it no better than the computers we are using right now.
If I ask you a question and somehow constrain you only to answer yes or no, that doesn't stop you being conscious as you decide your answer. There's a simulation of your whole brain in there, and it arrives at its yes/no answer by doing whatever your brain usually does to decide. All that's unusual is the context. (But the context is very unusual.)
Yet another exceptionally interesting blog post by Scott Aaronson, describing his talk at the Quantum Foundations of a Classical Universe workshop, videos of which should be posted soon. Despite the disclaimer "My talk is for entertainment purposes only; it should not be taken seriously by anyone", it raises several serious and semi-serious points about the nature of conscious experience and related paradoxes, which are generally overlooked by the philosophers, including Eliezer, because they have no relevant CS/QC expertise. For example:
Scott also suggests a model of consciousness which sort-of resolves the issues of cloning, identity and such, by introducing what he calls a "digital abstraction layer" (again, read the blog post to understand what he means by that). Our brains might be lacking such a layer and so be "fundamentally unclonable".
Another interesting observation is that you never actually kill the cat in the Schroedinger's cat experiment, for a reasonable definition of "kill".
There are several more mind-blowing insights in this "entertainment purposes" post/talk, related to the existence of p-zombies, consciousness of Boltzmann brains, the observed large-scale structure of the Universe and the "reality" of Tegmark IV.
I certainly got the humbling experience that Scott is the level above mine, and I would like to know if other people did, too.
Finally, the standard bright dilettante caveat applies: if you think up a quick objection to what an expert in the area argues, and you yourself are not such an expert, the odds are extremely heavy that this objection is either silly or has been considered and addressed by the expert already.