I disagree that "giving answers is an irreversible operation". My setup explicitly doesn't "forget" the calculation (the calculation being simulating someone proving the Riemann hypothesis, and us extracting that proof from the simulation), and my setup is explicitly reversible (because we have the full density matrix of the system at all times, and can in principle perform unitary time evolution backwards from the final state if we wanted to).
Nothing is ever being forgotten. I'm not sure where that came from, because I've never claimed that anything is being forgotten at any step. I'm not sure why you're insisting that things be forgotten to satisfy reversibility, either.
Yet another exceptionally interesting blog post by Scott Aaronson, describing his talk at the Quantum Foundations of a Classical Universe workshop, videos of which should be posted soon. Despite the disclaimer "My talk is for entertainment purposes only; it should not be taken seriously by anyone", it raises several serious and semi-serious points about the nature of conscious experience and related paradoxes, which are generally overlooked by the philosophers, including Eliezer, because they have no relevant CS/QC expertise. For example:
Scott also suggests a model of consciousness which sort-of resolves the issues of cloning, identity and such, by introducing what he calls a "digital abstraction layer" (again, read the blog post to understand what he means by that). Our brains might be lacking such a layer and so be "fundamentally unclonable".
Another interesting observation is that you never actually kill the cat in the Schroedinger's cat experiment, for a reasonable definition of "kill".
There are several more mind-blowing insights in this "entertainment purposes" post/talk, related to the existence of p-zombies, consciousness of Boltzmann brains, the observed large-scale structure of the Universe and the "reality" of Tegmark IV.
I certainly got the humbling experience that Scott is the level above mine, and I would like to know if other people did, too.
Finally, the standard bright dilettante caveat applies: if you think up a quick objection to what an expert in the area argues, and you yourself are not such an expert, the odds are extremely heavy that this objection is either silly or has been considered and addressed by the expert already.