Without the Russian soliders Kiev likely would have used violence to stop the Crimean government from holding a referendum.
Did they have any right to hold such a referendum? If they do, how come the Basques don't?
Kiev also didn't go through the impeachment process to remove the status of the old president so it's not clear why a dejure president shouldn't be allowed to ask an outside country for military assistance.
Whose law? Can the government of Taiwan authorize an invasion of China? Can Franz, Duke of Bavaria authorize an invasion of the UK? If I declare that under the lmmian constitution I am and always have been ruler of the US, does that grant me the right to invade?
I don't think the concept of a de jure president is coherent - the only way a constitution got written in the first place is when the de facto rulers chose so.
Did they have any right to hold such a referendum? If they do, how come the Basques don't?
As far as I'm concerned the Basque should have the right to hold a referendum.
I don't think the concept of a de jure president is coherent - the only way a constitution got written in the first place is when the de facto rulers chose so.
In what sense do you consider the Kiev government the de facto rulers of the whole of Ukraine including Crimea? The government got control over Kiev through the thread of using violence. It might have also got control of Crimea...
Some of the comments on the link by James_Miller exactly six months ago provided very specific estimates of how the events might turn out:
James_Miller:
Me:
"Russians intervening militarily" could be anything from posturing to weapon shipments to a surgical strike to a Czechoslovakia-style tank-roll or Afghanistan invasion. My guess that the odds of the latter is below 5%.
A bet between James_Miller and solipsist:
I will bet you $20 U.S. (mine) vs $100 (yours) that Russian tanks will be involved in combat in the Ukraine within 60 days. So in 60 days I will pay you $20 if I lose the bet, but you pay me $100 if I win.
While it is hard to do any meaningful calibration based on a single event, there must be lessons to learn from it. Given that Russian armored columns are said to capture key Ukrainian towns today, the first part of James_Miller's prediction has come true, even if it took 3 times longer than he estimated.
Note that even the most pessimistic person in that conversation (James) was probably too optimistic. My estimate of 5% appears way too low in retrospect, and I would probably bump it to 50% for a similar event in the future.
Now, given that the first prediction came true, how would one reevaluate the odds of the two further escalations he listed? I still feel that there is no way there will be a "conventional battle" between Russia and NATO, but having just been proven wrong makes me doubt my assumptions. If anything, maybe I should give more weight to what James_Miller (or at least Dan Carlin) has to say on the issue. And if I had any skin in the game, I would probably be even more cautious.