In what sense do you consider the Kiev government the de facto rulers of the whole of Ukraine including Crimea? The government got control over Kiev through the thread of using violence. It might have also got control of Crimea through the threat of violence if Russia wouldn't have protected the Crimean government from being violently coerced to follow the dictates of Kiev.
The uprising in Kiev was of course violent, but it was a popular one; the President had lost whatever legitimacy he once had (and given the allegations of electoral fraud, I'm not sure how much that is). Government is by the consent of the governed.
If you consider it legitimate for the popular ruler of a subset of a country to invite a foreign invasion then surely that makes the notion of self-determination meaningless. Any country X wanting to invade country Y can simply find the small region of country Y that supports them and get them to ask for an invasion.
(FWIW I don't think the new government in Kiev would have had the authority to invite a foreign intervention either, unless and until said government was widely recognized across the country. I would have argued for a UN peacekeeping force or similar international coalition, and referenda when people were secure enough to make it a free vote. But I think the Russian incursion makes it reasonable for Kiev to respond in kind)
Protecting a minority in a country from being violently coerced is what responsibility to protect is about.
But R2P is a novel theory with no basis in international law, right? Again, I suspect that in any case where country X wants to invade country Y they could find some reasonable-sounding principle that supports that invasion.
The ruler of Bavaria had never authority over the UK and according to the German constitution he doesn't have any authority over Bavaria either.
My point was that the Republic of China government claims legal authority over all of China. And that, although he renounces any claim to it, Duke Franz is the rightful heir to the British throne.
Let's say you would have a few US military generals who threaten a coup if Obama doesn't resign. Then Obama leaves Washington and a majority of the US congress makes a vote that John Boehner is the new president. Do you think that would mean that Obama loses his claim to being the president of the US?
I think it means Obama isn't ruler of the US until the two sides sort this mess out. And I think it means neither side has the right to invite foreign troops into the US. Again, isn't that the whole point of self-determination?
The uprising in Kiev was of course violent, but it was a popular one; the President had lost whatever legitimacy he once had
A lot of the parties agreed to a compromise before they pressured the president to flee. I don't think that if you don't like a compromise that was negotiated and with was accepted by most stakeholder you have legitimacy in removing the president via the thread of a coup.
They also didn't just pressured the president to flee but also destroyed infrastructure of the communist party via force. That's no good basis for peaceful democr...
Some of the comments on the link by James_Miller exactly six months ago provided very specific estimates of how the events might turn out:
James_Miller:
Me:
"Russians intervening militarily" could be anything from posturing to weapon shipments to a surgical strike to a Czechoslovakia-style tank-roll or Afghanistan invasion. My guess that the odds of the latter is below 5%.
A bet between James_Miller and solipsist:
I will bet you $20 U.S. (mine) vs $100 (yours) that Russian tanks will be involved in combat in the Ukraine within 60 days. So in 60 days I will pay you $20 if I lose the bet, but you pay me $100 if I win.
While it is hard to do any meaningful calibration based on a single event, there must be lessons to learn from it. Given that Russian armored columns are said to capture key Ukrainian towns today, the first part of James_Miller's prediction has come true, even if it took 3 times longer than he estimated.
Note that even the most pessimistic person in that conversation (James) was probably too optimistic. My estimate of 5% appears way too low in retrospect, and I would probably bump it to 50% for a similar event in the future.
Now, given that the first prediction came true, how would one reevaluate the odds of the two further escalations he listed? I still feel that there is no way there will be a "conventional battle" between Russia and NATO, but having just been proven wrong makes me doubt my assumptions. If anything, maybe I should give more weight to what James_Miller (or at least Dan Carlin) has to say on the issue. And if I had any skin in the game, I would probably be even more cautious.