If I create a little version of myself that can answer my emails for me, can I delete him when I'm done with him or just turn him in for a new model like I do iPhones?
The standard Schelling point for assigning "human rights" is self-awareness. I think Eliezer calls it "internal listener" or something like that. Maybe it is possible to create a subset of your mind without self-awareness, but intelligent enough to answer your emails the same way you would. After all, our "internal listener" is off quite often and we don't appear visibly stupid during these times.
Pretty sure babies aren't self-aware, while chimpanzees are. Yet the majority opinion is that the former has human rights and the latter doesn't.
Do Virtual Humans deserve human rights?
Slate Article
I think the idea of storing our minds in a machine so that we can keep on "living" (and I use that term loosely) is fascinating and certainly and oft discussed topic around here. However, in thinking about keeping our brains on a hard drive we have to think about rights and how that all works together. Indeed the technology may be here before we know it so I think its important to think about mindclones. If I create a little version of myself that can answer my emails for me, can I delete him when I'm done with him or just turn him in for a new model like I do iPhones?
I look forward to the discussion.