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DanielLC comments on Open thread, September 22-28, 2014 - Less Wrong Discussion
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People are more likely to believe true things, so someone believing something is evidence that it's true. If you find out that they're especially likely to believe this even if it's not true, but not proportionately more likely to believe it if it is, then the fact that they believe it is not as strong evidence. Thus, if it's a given that they believe it, finding out that they'd believe it either way is evidence against it.
I'd throw in a modifier that people are most likely to believe true things about areas where they have direct experience and get feedback. It's something like near and far, and the near has to be very near. Give extra points if the experience is recent.
The less a theory meets those constraints, the less you should think belief is evidence that it's true.
How do you know this?
It's an implicit assumption that you have to make before you can get anywhere, like modus ponens. From there, you can refine your beliefs more.
Modus ponens can be demonstrated to be a valid assumption by drawing up a truth table. How do you demonstrate that "people are more likely to believe true things"?
Using truth tables seems more complicated than modus ponens. I would expict it would be better to use modus ponens to justify truth tables as opposed to the other way around. Regardless, you need to start with something. You can't justify modus ponens to a rock.
If you don't think people are more likely to believe true things, then how do you justify any of that stuff you just said being true?