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Vaniver comments on Polymath-style attack on the Parliamentary Model for moral uncertainty - Less Wrong Discussion
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The idea of explicit vote-selling is probably the easiest way to have 'enforceable contracts' without things getting particularly sticky. (If you have ordered votes and no enforceable contracts, then vote order becomes super important and trading basically breaks apart. But if you have ordered votes and vote sales, then trading is still possible because the votes can't switch.)
But I don't think the prices are going to be that interesting- if the vote's on the edge, then all votes are valuable, but as soon as one vote changes hand the immediate price of all votes drops back to 0. Calculating the value of, say, amassing enough votes to deter any trading on that vote seems like it might add a lot of murkiness without much increased efficiency.
The voting system is set up to avoid these edge effects. From the opening post:
Hm, somehow I failed to notice that. It's not clear to me that you want to avoid the edge effects, though; delegates might trade away influence on contentious issues (where we have significant moral uncertainty) to double down on settled issues (where we have insignificant moral uncertainty), if the settled issues are sufficiently important. Eliezer's concern that delegates could threaten to vote 'no' on something important would make others desperately buy their votes away from them- unless you have a nonlinearity which makes the delegates secure that a lone filibuster won't cause trouble.
[edit]On second thought, though, it seems likely to be desirable that delegates / the parliament would behave linearly in the probability of various moral theories. The concern is mostly that this means we'll end up doing averaging, and nothing much more interesting.