You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

jessicat comments on Baysian conundrum - Less Wrong Discussion

11 Post author: Jan_Rzymkowski 13 October 2014 12:39AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (26)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: jessicat 13 October 2014 07:52:16AM 1 point [-]

I think the conflict dissolves if you actually try to use your anticipation to do something useful.

Example. Suppose you can either push button A (before 11AM) so that if you're still in the room you get a small happiness reward, or you can push button B so if you're transported to paradise you get a happiness reward. If you value happiness in all your copies equally, you should push button B, which means that you "anticipate" being transported to paradise.

This gets a little weird with the clones and to what extent you should care about them, but there's an analogous situation where I think the anthropic measure solution is clearly more intuitive: death. Suppose the many worlds interpretation is true and you set up a situation so that you die in 99% of worlds. Then should you "anticipate" death, or anticipate surviving? Anticipating death seems like the right thing. A hedonist should not be willing to sacrifice 1 unit of pleasure before quantum suicide in order to gain 10 units on the off chance that they survive.

So I think that one's anticipation of the future should not be a probability distribution over sensory input sequences (which sums to 1), but rather a finite non-negative distribution (which sums to a non-negative real number).