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ArisKatsaris comments on Baysian conundrum - Less Wrong Discussion

11 Post author: Jan_Rzymkowski 13 October 2014 12:39AM

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Comment author: ArisKatsaris 15 October 2014 02:22:43PM 0 points [-]

We have no idea how consciousness work, how probabilities can be assigned on expectation of being a given person, or the expectation of experiencing something. "If there are a million ants for every living human being, why am I a person instead of an ant?" may be a meaningful question, or then again it may not.

But to answer your question, my expectation is that for the probability of 'tropical paradise in one minute' to exceed 50% the calculation of your simulated selves combined will need to take up a physical volume that exceeds the volume taken up by your current brain (or the portion of your current brain devoted to your consciousness).