You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

KatjaGrace comments on Superintelligence 6: Intelligence explosion kinetics - Less Wrong Discussion

9 Post author: KatjaGrace 21 October 2014 01:00AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (67)

You are viewing a single comment's thread.

Comment author: KatjaGrace 21 October 2014 01:45:02AM 7 points [-]

This chapter seems to present some examples of how algorithmic recalcitrance could be very low, but I think it doesn't, in the relevant sense. Two of the three arguments in that part of the chapter (p69-70) are about how low recalcitrance might be mistaken for high recalcitrance, rather than about how low recalcitrance would occur. (One says that a system whose performance is the maximum of two parts might shift its growth from that of one part to that of the other; the other says we might be biased to not notice growth in dumb-seeming entities). The third argument (or first, chronologically) is that a key insight might be discovered after many other things are in place. This is conceivable, but seems to rarely happen at a large scale, and comes with no particular connection with intelligence - you could make exactly the same argument about any project (e.g. the earlier intelligence augmentation projects).

Comment author: Larks 01 December 2014 01:31:31AM 0 points [-]

Yes, I agree. On page 68 he points out that the types of problems pre-EM are very different from those post-EM, but it could be that availability bias makes the former seem larger than the latter. We are more familiar with them, and have broken them down into many sub-problems.

Paradoxically, even though this 'taskification' is progress towards EMs, it makes them appear further away as they highlight the conjunctive nature of the task. Our estimates for the difficulty of a task probably over-state the difficulty of easy tasks and under-state the difficulty of easy tasks, which could mean that breaking down a problem increases our estimate of its difficulty, because it is now 10 tasks-worth-of-effort rather than one-tasks-worth-of-effort.