Well, suppose I suddenly became 200 feet tall. The moral thing to do would be for me to:
Be careful where I step.
Might we not consider programming in some forms of caution?
An AGI is neither omniscient nor clairvoyant. It should know that its interactions with the world will have unpredictable outcomes, and so it should first do a lot of thinking and simulation, then it should make small experiments.
In discussions will lukeprog, I referred to this approach as "Managed Roll-Out."
AGI could be introduced in ways that parallel the introduction of a new drug to the market: A "Pre-clinical" phase where the system is only operated in simulation, then a series of small, controlled interactions with the outside world- Phase I, Phase II...Phase N trials.
Before each trial, a forecast is made of the possible outcomes.
Might we not consider programming in some forms of caution?
Caution sounds great, but if it turns out that the AI's goals do indeed lead to killing all humans or what have you, it will only delay these outcomes, no? So caution is only useful if we program its goals wrong, it realises that humans might consider that its goals are wrong, and allows us to take another shot at giving it goals that aren't wrong. Or basically, corrigibility.
This is part of a weekly reading group on Nick Bostrom's book, Superintelligence. For more information about the group, and an index of posts so far see the announcement post. For the schedule of future topics, see MIRI's reading guide.
Welcome. This week we discuss the eighth section in the reading guide: Cognitive Superpowers. This corresponds to Chapter 6.
This post summarizes the section, and offers a few relevant notes, and ideas for further investigation. Some of my own thoughts and questions for discussion are in the comments.
There is no need to proceed in order through this post, or to look at everything. Feel free to jump straight to the discussion. Where applicable and I remember, page numbers indicate the rough part of the chapter that is most related (not necessarily that the chapter is being cited for the specific claim).
Reading: Chapter 6
Summary
Another view
Bostrom starts the chapter claiming that humans' dominant position comes from their slightly expanded set of cognitive functions relative to other animals. Computer scientist Ernest Davis criticizes this claim in a recent review of Superintelligence:
Notes
In-depth investigations
If you are particularly interested in these topics, and want to do further research, these are a few plausible directions, almost entirely taken from Luke Muehlhauser's list, without my looking into them further.
How to proceed
This has been a collection of notes on the chapter. The most important part of the reading group though is discussion, which is in the comments section. I pose some questions for you there, and I invite you to add your own. Please remember that this group contains a variety of levels of expertise: if a line of discussion seems too basic or too incomprehensible, look around for one that suits you better!
Next week, we will talk about the orthogonality of intelligence and goals, section 9. To prepare, read The relation between intelligence and motivation from Chapter 7. The discussion will go live at 6pm Pacific time next Monday November 10. Sign up to be notified here.