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Comments (317)
This site drains my energy. Too many topics seem interesting on the surface but are really just depressing and not actionable, with the big example being a bad singularity.
I have also found in my life that general, useful advice is rare. Most advice here seems either too vague or too specific to the poster. I did find at least one helpful book (by Scott Adams) and a couple of good posts, but think other sources could help at less cost. There are many smart people here, but if you look you can find something much more useful: smart people who have already achieved the particular goals you seek.
Bye.
I have been playing the card game Hanabi one hell of a lot recently, and I strongly recommend it to the LW community.
Hanabi is an abstract, cooperative game with limited information. And it's practically a tutorial in rational thinking in a group. Extrapolating unstated facts from other players' belief states is essential: "X did something that doesn't make sense given what I know; what is it that X knows but I don't, under which that action makes sense?" So, for that matter, is a consequentialist view of communication: "If I tell X the fact P, what will they do? Not what will they believe or know, but what actions should I expect they will take?"
Two people I've played with have told me that the game has positively affected their understanding of communication.
Seconding too.
I've played in very small groups (~3), and the game usually stabilizes into predictable strategies (1 discards, 2 gives information, 3 puts down, and after a while switch between 2 and 3). Larger groups are probably messier and funnier, but nonetheless, very instructive.
Seconding this recommendation.
From a comment on SSC:
Does anyone close to CFAR know the specifics?
As someone who has taken the NIMS/ICS 100 course (online through FEMA), and gone to my local fire station and taken their equivalent of NIMS/ICS 100/200/70 -- I was not very impressed.
I can clearly see that there are valuable things in NIMS/ICS, and I can even believe that the movement which gave rise to the whole thing had valuable, interesting, and novel insights. But you're not going to get much of that by taking the course. It's got about one important concept -- which basically boils down to "it's good for different agencies to cooperate effectively, and here's one structure under which that empirically seems to happen well, therefore let's all use it" -- and the rest is a lot of details and terminology which are critically important to people actually working in said agencies, and mostly irrelevant otherwise.
EDIT: Boromir's big thing seems to be that HRO is about risk analysis, updating based on evidence, and dealing with low probabilities as mentioned in the excerpt. I can tell you that the basic ICS course covers exactly none of that. So I wonder what 'training course at the local volunteer fire department' he thinks we should all take. (I admit I have not taken the FEMA-official ICS 200 and 70 classes, which are online. But given the style of the 100 class, I cannot imagine them being dense with the kind of knowledge he thinks we should be gaining from them.)
I'm not particularly close to the CFAR wing of that crowd, but: on the one hand, that sounds at least potentially valuable, and I'd look into it if I had anything more specific to go on than "a simple training course". (Poking around my local fire department's webpage turned up only something called "Community Emergency Response Training", which seems to consist of first aid, disaster prep, and basic firefighting -- too narrow and skill-based to be what Boromir's comment is talking about.)
On the other hand, though, I don't think we're getting the full story here. The fact that Boromir devotes most of his comment to flogging the organization he's (judging from his username's link) either a member or a fanboy of, in particular, is a very bad sign.
Interesting, though apparently this person made his suggestions to Salamon and Yudkowsky in person, not to the LW community itself - thus, his reference to "outright derision" is somewhat misleading. CFAR has indeed adopted some ideas that originally came from LW itself - the whole "goal factoring" theme of recent CFAR workshops seems to be a significant example.
I've been trying to decide whether or not to pursue an opportunity to spread rationalist memes to an audience that wouldn't ordinarily be exposed to them. I happen to be friends with the CEO and editor of an online magazine/community blog that caters to queer women, and I'm reasonably confident that with the right pitch I could convince them to let me do a column dedicated to rationality as it relates to the specific interests of queer women. I think there might be value in tailoring rationality material for specific demographics.
The issue is that, in order to make it relevant to the website and the demographic, I would need to talk about politics while trying to teach rationality, which seems highly risky. As one might imagine from the demographic, the website and associated community is heavily influenced by social justice memes, many of which I wholeheartedly endorse and many others of which I'm highly critical of. The strategy I've been formulating to avoid getting everybody mindkilled is to talk about the ways biases contibute to sexisim and homophobia, and then also talk about how those same bias can manifest in feminist/social justice ideas, while emphasising to death how important it is to avoid Fully General Counterarguments, but it still seems risky.
The other issue is that it might not be such a good idea to try to teach rationality when I'm still learning myself, and haven't really participated in the rationalist community. OTOH when will I ever be done learning, and should I let this opportunity pass by?
The potential Pros are; Improving the quality of discourse within my community, providing a space for the more rationalist members of that community, and spreading rationalist memes. Also, if it works out, it would probably raise my relative status within the community, which may be clouding my judgement of how good an idea it is.
The potential Cons are; That I might mess up and mindkill everyone, that I might say something too critical that gets me socially ostracize, and that I might accidentally write something foolish on the internet that I later regret.
Thoughts?
There a good strategy against publishing something stupid: Peer review before publication.
Something that's missing from a lot of social justice talk is quoting cognitive science papers. Talking about actual experiments and what the audience can learn from them could make people care more about empiricism.
I was planning to have one of my friends from the community around that website test read the articles for me, though I might also benefit from having a rationalist test read them, if anybody wants to volunteer.
Discussing cognitive science experiments is part of the plan. I actually performed a version of the 2-4-6 experiment on a group of people associated with the website (while dressed as a court jester!(it was during a renaissance fair)) and as predicted only 20% of them got it right. I think knowing that members of their own ingroup are just as susceptible to bias as faceless experimental subjects will help get the point across.
I volunteer for giving you feedback on a few articles.
Nice blog post about AI and existential risks by my friend and occasional LW poster. He was inspired by disappointingly bad debate on Edge.org. Feel free to share if you like it. I think it is a quite good introduction on Bostrom's and MIRI arguments.
"The problem is harder than it looks, we don’t know how to solve it, and if we don’t solve it we will go extinct."
http://nthlook.wordpress.com/2014/11/26/why-fear-ai/
Seems very good, but this is coming from a person familiar with the topic. I wonder how good it would seem to someone who hasn't heard about the topic yet.
Calico, the aging research company founded by Google, is hiring.
This may be a naive question, which has a simple answer, but I haven't seen it. Please enlighten me.
I'm not clear on why an AI should have a utility function at all.
The computer I'm typing this on doesn't. It simply has input-output behavior. When I hit certain keys it reacts in certain, very complex ways, but it doesn't decide. It optimizes, but only when I specifically tell it to do so, and only on the parameters that I give it.
We tend to think of world-shaping GAI as an agent with it's own goals, which it seeks to implement. Why can't it be more like a computing machine in a box. We could feed it questions, like "given this data, will it rain tomorrow?", or "solve this protein folding problem", or "which policy will best reduce gun-violence?", or even "given these specific parameters and definitions, how do we optimize for human happiness?" For the complex answers like the last of those, we could then ask the AI to model the state of the world that results from following this policy. If we see that it leads to tiling the universe with smiley faces, we know that we made a mistake somewhere (that wasn't what we were trying to optimize for), and adjust the parameters. We might even train the AI over time, so that it learns how to interpret what we mean from what we say. When the AI models a state of the world that actually reflects our desires, then we implement it's suggestions ourselves, or perhaps only then hit the implement button, by with the AI takes the steps to carry out it's plan. We might even use such a system to check the safety of future generations of the AI. This would slow recursive self improvement, but it seems it would be much safer.
First, there's the political problem: if you can build agent AI and just choose not to, this doesn't help very much when someone else builds their UFAI (which they want to do, because agent AI is very powerful and therefore very useful). So you have to get everyone on board with the plan first. Also, having your superintelligent oracle makes it much easier for someone else to build an agent: just ask the oracle how. If you don't solve Friendliness, you have to solve the incentives instead, and "solve politics" doesn't look much easier than "solve metaethics."
Second, the distinction between agents and oracles gets fuzzy when the AI is much smarter than you. Suppose you ask the AI how to reduce gun violence: it spits out a bunch of complex policy changes, which are hard for you to predict the effects of. But you implement them, and it turns out that they result in drastically reduced willingness to have children. The population plummets, and gun violence deaths do too. "Okay, how do I reduce per capita gun violence?", you ask. More complex policy changes; this time they result in increased pollution which disproportionately depopulates the demographics most likely to commit gun violence. "How do I reduce per capita gun violence without altering the size or demographic ratios of the population?" Its recommendations cause a worldwide collapse of the firearms manufacturing industry, and gun violence plummets, along with most metrics of human welfare.
If you have to blindly implement policies you can't understand, you're not really much better off than letting the AI implement them directly. There are some things you can do to mitigate this, but ultimately the AI is smarter than you. If you could fully understand all its ideas, you wouldn't have needed to ask it.
Does this sound familiar? It's the untrustworthy genie problem again. We need a trustworthy genie, one that will answer the questions we mean to ask, not just the questions we actually ask. So we need an oracle that understands and implements human values, which puts us right back at the original problem of Friendliness!
Non-agent AI might be a useful component of realistic safe AI development, just as "boxing" might be. Seatbelts are a good idea too, but it only matters if something has already gone wrong. Similarly, oracle AI might help, but it's not a replacement for solving the actual problem.
This has been proposed before, and on LW is usually referred to as "Oracle AI". There's an entry for it on the LessWrong wiki, including some interesting links to various discussions of the idea. Eliezer has addressed it as well.
See also Tool AI, from the discussions between Holden Karnofsky and LW.
I was just reading though the Eliezer article. I'm not sure I understand. Is he saying that my computer actually does have goals?
Isn't there a difference between simple cause and effect and an optimization process that aims at some specific state?
Maybe it would help to "taboo" the word "goal".
A process can progress towards some end state even without having any representation of that state. Imagine a program that takes a positive number at the beginning, and at each step replaces the current number "x" with value "x/2 + 1/x". Regardless of the original number, the values will gradually move towards a constant. Can we say that this process has a "goal" or achieving the given number? It feels wrong to use this word here, because the constant is nowhere in the process, it just happens.
Typically, when we speak about having a "goal" X, we mean that somewhere (e.g. in human brain, or in the company's mission statement) there is a representation of X, and then the reality is compared with X, various paths from here to X are evaluated, and then one of those paths is followed.
I am saying this to make more obvious that there is a difference between "having a representation of X" and "progressing towards X". Humans typically create representations of their desired end states, and then try finding a way to achieve them. Your computer doesn't have this, and neither does "Tool AI" at the beginning. Whether it can create representations later, that depends on technical details, how specifically such "Tool AI" is programmed.
Maybe there is a way to allow superhuman thinking even without creating representations corresponding to things normally perceived in our world. (For example AIXI.) But even in such case, there is a risk of having a pseudo-goal of the "x/2 + 1/x" kind, where the process progresses towards an outcome even without having a representation of it. AI can "escape from the box" even without having a representation of "box" and "escape", if there exists a way to escape from it.
I don't get this explanation. Sure, a process can tend toward a certain result, without having an explicit representation of that result. But such tendencies often seem to be fragile. For example, a car engine homeostatically tends toward a certain idle speed. But take out one or all spark plugs, and the previously stable performance evaporates. Goals-as-we-know-them, by contrast, tend to be very robust. When a human being loses a leg, they will obtain a synthetic one, or use a wheelchair. That kind of robustness is part of what makes a very powerful agent scary, because it is intimately related to the agent's seeing many things as potential resources to use toward its ends.
This is actually one of the standard counterarguments against the need for friendly AI, at least against the notion that is should be an agent / be capable of acting as an agent.
I'll try to quickly summarize the counter-counter arguments Nick Bostrom gives in Superintelligence. (In the book, AI that is not agent at all is called tool AI. AI that is an agent but cannot act as one (has no executive power in the real world) is called oracle AI.)
Some arguments have already been mentioned:
There is also a possibility of what Bostrom calls mind crime. If a tool or oracle AI is not inherently friendly, it might simulate sentient minds in order to give the answers to the questions that we ask; kill or possibly even torture these minds. The possibility that these simulations have moral rights is low, but there can be trillions of them, so even a low probability cannot be ignored.
Finally, it might be that the best strategy for a tool AI to give answer is to internally develop an agent-type AI that is capable of self-improvement. If the default outcome of creating a self-improving AI is doom, then the tool AI scenario might in fact be less safe.
If you use a spell checking engine while you are typing that likely has an utility function buried in it's code.
Anyone want to comment on a pilot episode of a podcast "Rationalists in Tech"? Please PM or email me. I'll ask for your feedback and suggestions for improvement on a 30-minute audio interview with a leading technologist from the LW community. This will allow me to plan an even better series of further interviews with senior professionals, consultants, founders, and executives in technology, mostly in software.
Discussion topics will include the relevance of CfAR-style techniques to the career and daily work of a tech professional; tips on career aimed at LWer technologists; and the rationality-related products and services of some interviewees;
The goal is to show LessWrongers in the tech sector that they have a community of like-minded people. Often engineers, particularly those just starting out, have heard of the value of networking, but don't know where they can find people who they can and should connect to. Similarly, LWers who are managers or owners are always on the lookout for talent. This will highlight some examples of other LWers in the sector as an inspiration for networking.
This is a disturbing talk from Schmidhuber (who worked with Hutter and one of the founders of Deep Mind at the Swiss AI lab).
I say disturbing because of the last minute where he basically says we should be thankful for being the stepping stone to the next step in an evolution towards a world ran by AI's.
This is the nonsense we see repeated almost everywhere (outside lesswrong) that we should be happy to have humanity supplanted by the more intelligent AI, and here it is coming from a pretty wellknown AI researcher... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQ35zNlyG-o
Today I read a post by Bryan Caplan aimed toward effective altruists:
For context, Argentina essentially allows immigration by anybody who can get an employer to sponsor them.
what could a faltering, medium-trust country like argentina need more than millions of poor, low-trust immigrants
It's a common framing, and so I don't intend to pick on you, but I think the key issue isn't levels of trust, but levels of trustworthiness. Yes, there can be feedback effects in both directions between trust and trustworthiness, but fundamentally, it is possible for people and institutions with high trustworthiness to thrive in an otherwise low-trust/trustworthiness society. Indeed, lacking competitors, they may find it particularly easy to do so, and through gradual growth and expansion, lead to a high-trust/trustworthiness society over time. It is not possible for people and institutions with high trust to thrive in an otherwise low-trust/trustworthiness society, as they will be taken advantage of.
You can't bootstrap a society to a high-trust equilibrium by encouraging people to trust more. You need to encourage them to keep their promises.
I think this line of thinking is productive. Other thoughts:
For cooperative agents to thrive among non-cooperators, they must be able to identity other cooperators. Of course you can wait for the non-cooperators to identity themselves (via an act of non-cooperation in tit-for-tat, or a costly signal), but other agents are inevitably going to rely on other heuristics and information to predict the hidden strategies of others, and, when the agents are human, they will do this in a risk-averse way.
Accordingly, a low-trust society (one in which no single entity is able or willing to enforce cooperative behavior over all individuals) is seldom homogeneously low-trust (or low trustworthiness), but rather a amalgamation of subgroups, each of which is relatively more trusting and trustworthy, but only within the subgroup. Because of the need to guess at the hidden strategies of others, these subgroups don't necessarily split the society into "levels of trustworthiness".
The task of moving to a high trust/trustworthiness society becomes the task of getting cooperative subgroups to identity other potentially cooperative subgroups, and for those two subgroups to figure out a way to share the duty of enforcing cooperative behavior, or of allowing more true information about the cooperative behavior of individuals to flow between groups.
Since evolution produces a special cooperation in close-kinship relations, the simplest artificial grounds for merging two previously uncooperative subgroups is to stretch the kinship relation as far as possible (as in clans, or any society where third- and fourth-cousin relationships are considered relevant).
Some other examples related to this process:
It's a bit of theory of everything, but I think this is a helpful framing.
I'm looking for an old post. Something about an extinct species of primate that may once have been nearly as smart as humans, but evolved over time to be much dumber, apparently because the energy costs of intelligence were maladaptive in its environment.
Can anyone point me in the right direction?
http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/8bl/link_back_to_the_trees/
Perfect, thank you.
The header for this page says "You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet.". It's inaccurate because Discussion doesn't include the posts which were started in Main.
Stuart Russell contributes a response to the Edge.org article from earlier this month.
ELI5...
Why can't we program hard stops into AI, where it is required to pause and ask for further instruction?
Why is "spontaneous emergence of consciousness and evil intent" not a risk?
Because instructions are words, and "ask for instructions" implies an ability to understand and a desire to follow. The desire to follow instructions according to their givers' intentions is more-or-less a restatement of the Hard Problem of FAI itself: how do we formally specify a utility function that converges to our own in the limit of increasing optimization power and autonomy?
If the AI is aware of the pauses, it can try to eliminate them (if the pauses are triggered by a circumstance X, it can find a clever way to technically avoid X), or to make itself receive the "instruction" it wants to receive (e.g. by threating or hypnotising a human, or by doing something that technically counts as human input).
Finally some common sense. I was seriously disappointed in statements made by people I usually admire (Pinker, Schremer). It just shows how much we still have to go in communicating AI risk to the general public when even the smartest intellectuals dismiss this idea before any rational analysis.
I'm really looking forward to Elon Musk's comment.
I think there may people here that can benefit from this.
http://www.nerdfitness.com/
We shouldn't select our fitness gurus for whether they're of our tribe, we should select our fitness gurus for the effectiveness and truth of what they teach.
On that basis, do you have any reasons beyond "it's nerdy!" for recommending this website over any number of other ones, many of which are very good? If it's the gimmicky motivational approaches, I think LessWrong has that down pat - loads of us play HabitRPG and I'm pretty sure Beeminder's founders were some of our own.
Edit: For some reason my links ate themselves and the text between them so I took them out.
I'm not especially impressed with Steve Kamb as a fitness guru. He has a writing style I find accessible, and doesn't seem to mind covering introductory material, which are pluses, but not outstanding in the fitness world. The gimmicky motivational approaches probably work for some people, but I find them silly.
I've found the forums to be a very valuable resource, though. Lots of knowledgeable people whose brains you can pick, and a structure for social support/accountability, which can be scarce in meatspace.
You are right, but much of the fitness game is motivation, and we are tribal organisms. Being part of a community to which one relates, that pushes you to be better, is a huge benefit.
Maybe this is a solved problem, but I think there might be at least one person here with whom it resonates, and to whom it could provide substantial value.
In general what this community is about is having good arguments for doing what you do. As such it usually makes sense if a person who advocates some practices makes the case for the practice instead of simply posting a link.
In this case, did you follow that program? What results did you get?
In business, almost all executive decisions (headcount and budget allocation, which unproven products to push ahead with aggressively, translating forecasts for macroeconomic risks into business-specific policies, who to promote to other executive level positions, etc.) are made with substantial uncertainty. Or to put it another way, any executive-level decision-maker would be paralyzed without strong priors. This is especially true in fast-changing or competitive markets, where the only way to collect more evidence without direct risk is to let your competitors jump in the water first.
In other words, the kind of certainty we hold out for (often vainly) in science is almost unknown in many aspects of business, and the most critical decisions are often the most uncertain.
It's very "Black Swan" (in the sense of Taleb's whole, not just tail risk).
Thoughts?
I don't think that's necessarily true, just having a high risk tolerance works as well. I also think you underestimate the amount of evidence present -- e.g. in most organizations the next-year budget is a variation on the previous year's budget.
Yes, of course. That's why, for example, risk management is an important part of doing business but is not normally a big part of doing science...
Risk tolerance is a good, possibly more correct, way of looking at it. Actually most executives probably have a mixture of risk tolerance and strong priors.
Some businesses can get away with only relatively low-risk, safe decisions and focus on efficient operations. However, I think the majority of businesses, especially newer and growing ones, can't get away with this consistently or for a long time. And most businesses simply don't have that long a life, period.
Setting a budget based off last years' when your revenue is growing 50%+ YoY won't work well.
What I was thinking of more specifically is that something like setting a budget can be defined as a rigorous optimization problem, but with highly uncertain parameters (marginal return on investment from various units of the business). Any decision made implies a combination of prior over those values and risk tolerance.
If you treat budgeting as an optimization problem, you need forecasts, not priors.
I would also suspect that real-life business budgets will be hard to set as "rigorous optimization problems" because in reality you have discontinuities, nonlinear responses, and all kinds of funky dependencies between different parts of the budget.
I don't think you understand what the term means. It's unknown unknowns and not known unknowns. Whether or not an unproven product will succeed is a question about a known unknown.
I don't think that's true. There are various forms of doing market research that simply involve money but not additional risk.
I use "Black Swan" in the context of the whole book. That is, we build narratives after-the-fact to explain correct priors as skill and judgment. Also, the greater impact of more uncertain decisions, in a way that ties uncertainty to the impact, is exactly the nature of unknown-unknown black swans (which I'd say the launching of a substantially new product category fits into, in a mild form. The iPod/iTunes was not a black swan for Apple, though they took considerable risks with it. It was a black swan for the music industry.).
Market research is better than nothing, but still has many problems. Most of it wouldn't pass peer review, and we know peer review makes plenty of mistakes. So when taking it into account, decision-makers must apply strong priors.
And on the occasions that market research really is that good, it's a no-brainer; your competitors will do it too.
Please don't take terminology with fairly precise meaning and use it idiosyncratically. At best, you unnecessary increase your inferential distance. At worst, you dilute the term so that it increases everyone's inferential distance.
Edited for clarity. Thought terms get diluted all the time.
Maybe "Talebian" would be more appropriate.
Development aid is really hard.
A project that works well in one place or for a little while may not scale. Focus on administrative costs may make charities less competent.
Nonetheless, some useful help does happen, it's just important to not chase after the Big Ideas.
One of the charities mentioned in the article, Deworm the World, is actually a Givewell top charity, due to "the strong evidence for deworming having lasting impact on childhood development". The article, on the other hand, claims that the evidence is weak, citing three studies in the British Medical Journal, which Givewell doesn't appear to mention in their review of the effectiveness of deworming.
Givewell's review of deworming
Might be worth looking into more.
Something that should have occurred to me-- the deworming experiment was done in the late 90s, which means that the effect on lifetime income is an estimate.
TLDR: Requesting articles/papers/books that feature detailed/explicit "how-to" sections for bio-feedback/visualization/mental training for improving performance (mostly mental, but perhaps cognitive as well)
Years ago I saw an interview with Michael Phelps' (Olympic swimmer) coach in which he claims that most Olympic-finalist caliber swimmers have nearly indistinguishable physical capabilities, Phelps' ability to focus and visualize success is what set him apart.
I also saw a program about free divers (staying underwater for minutes) who slow their heart-rates through meditation.
I also read that elite military units visualize to remain calm and carry out complex tasks despite incredible stress (for instance, bomb squad members with heart rates lower in the presence of a bomb than on an average afternoon at the base). Unfortunately I didn't record the sources of these various pieces, so I can't link to them
Has anyone read any specific how-to books on the topic, i.e., here are step-by-step instructions for visualizations, lowering heart rate, mental clarity, etc?
I'm skeptical of this.
No doubt it is relatively true that professional/elite athletes have similar physical capabilities, but even very small differences in athletic ability can be very consequential over the course of XXX meters in a swimming race or, say an entire season of football. We are talking about very small margins of victory in many (or most) cases.
I agree that small physical differences can be very consequential--wouldn't small mental differences be similarly consequential?
http://www.radiolab.org/story/91618-lying-to-ourselves/
This radiolab episode discusses how swimmers who engage in more self-deception win more frequently, controlling for other factors (i.e., self-deceivers on a division 3, 2, and 1 teams are more likely to beat their opponents, so at different levels of physical skill their mentality is predictive).
I'm not sure what you're getting at here--that the victory of a particular person is attributable to noise because the margin of error is small?
Great points.
In Phelps' case, I think he is physically superior—though perhaps only slightly—compared to the competition. Same with Usain Bolt.
I'd agree confidence, even to the extent it is self-deception, can make a significant difference when it comes to sports performance. However, when an athlete—like Phelps or Bolt—routinely wins over the course of several races spanning years, I think physical capability differences are the main reason.
In team sports, or really any sport that requires more than just straight line speed, I think psychological difference are very important. But swimming and sprinting are largely physical contests. Unless you have problems with false starts, I'm not seeing where the mental edge figures in.
(Obviously longer races that require endurance and pacing considerations are more prone to psychological influence.)
The book On Combat by Dave Grossman discusses some of these things. I haven't read it yet, but have read reviews and listened to a podcast by two people I consider highly evidence-based and reputable (here). In particular, the book discusses a method of physiologically lowering your heart rate he calls "Combat Breathing". This entails 4 phases, each for the durations of a count of 4 (no unit specified, I do approx 4 seconds):
Breathe in
Hold in
Breathe out
Hold out
It sounds very simple, but I have heard multiple recommendations of it from both the armed-forces and medical worlds. I can also add a data point confirming it works well for me (mostly only for reducing heart rate to below 100, not all the way down to resting rate).
The first step of how to of biofeedback means getting a biofeedback device.
Direct heart rate is no good goal. Doing biofeedback on heart rate variance is better.
I'm not sure whether you want a bomb squad to have a heart rate that's lower than normal.
Step-by-step instructions are not how you achieve the kind of results of Phelps or the bomb squat. Both are done through the guidance of coaches.
To the extend that the main way I meditate has steps it has three: 1. Listen to the silence 2. Be still 3. Close your eyes.
Among those (3) is obvious in meaning. (1) takes getting used to and is probably not accessible by mere reading. Understanding the meaning of (2) takes months.
Thanks for your reply.
Can you point me to any articles/sites about biofeedback devices? Have you done biofeedback yourself?
Perhaps you're right about the bomb squad heart rate, maybe a moderately raised rate would be a proxy for optimal/peak arousal levels. However, I'd guess that a little too much calm is better than overwhelming panic, which would probably be a more typical reaction to approaching a bomb that's about to explode.
I agree that a coach would be better, but a book is a more practical option at the moment.
(this may sound snarky, but isn't) Did you learn meditation from a teacher, or from a step-by-step book? The steps you give seem are simple (not easy), and a good starting point. I think a meditation coach would help you flesh these out, but those kinds of precise instruction are what I'm looking for.
Yes, and people at LW are in generally very bad at simple. People here have the skills for dealing with complex intellectual subjects.
The problem with "be still" is that it leaves you with question like: "4 minutes in the meditation I feel the desire to adjust my position, what do I do?" It doesn't give you a easy criteria to decide when moving to change your position violates "be still" and when it doesn't.
Doing biofeedback is still on my todo list.
My device knowledge might be 1-2 years out of date. Before that point the situation was that emWave2 and wilddivine were the good non-EGG based solutions. Good EGG based solutions are more expensive. See also a QS-forum article on neurofeedback. Even through the QS forum is very low in terms of posts, posting a question there on topics like this is still a good idea (Bias disclosure: I'm a mod at the QS-Forum).
Among those two emWave2 basically only goes over heart rate variance (HRV) and WildDevine also measures skin conductance level (SCL) with is a proxy for the amount that you sweat. WildDevine also has a patent for doing biofeedback with HRV + SCL. emWave2 is with 149$ at the moment AFAIK the cheapest choice for a good device that comes with a good explanation of how to do training with it and that you can just use as is.
I started with learning meditation from a book by Aikido master Koichi Tohei ten years ago. I have roughly three years of in person training. I also have NLP/Hypnosis training since that time. If I would switch out an emotional response of the bomb swat, then hypnosis is probably the tool of choice. With biofeedback I would see no reason for overcompensation. Switching out an emotional response via hypnosis on the other hand can lead to such effects. Hearing an alarm of an ambulance might also lower my heart rate ;)
There are also safety issues. I don't like the idea of people messing themselves up and are faced with experiences that they can't handle because they don't have proper supervision.
A song about self-awareness:
It seems that, in order to accomplish anything, one needs some combination of conscientiousness, charisma, and/or money*. It seems that each of the three can strengthen the others:
If someone lacks all of these resources severely enough, is there any way to correct that? It rather seems like the answer is "no, but most people can't imagine someone with that much of a deficit in all three at the same time".
* Yes, I could have gone for alliteration with "cash", "credit", or "capital". Money seems different enough that the dissonance seemed like a better idea at the time.
Don't start with the resources you lack. Start with the resources you have and then look how can you utilize them to achieve your aims.
All of those things can be mitigated by other traits. Connections can be useful even without very much charisma. Cleverness can lead to pretty good earning potential even with relatively little conscientiousness, and may help one think of ways to improve charisma and conscientiousness. At any given level of earning potential, being cheap ("frugal" would be a better word but begins with the wrong letter) eases the transition from gradually sliding into debt to gradually accumulating savings. Other aspects of character besides conscientiousness make a difference -- e.g., a reputation for honesty may be helpful.
Given a bad enough deficit in everything that matters, it's certainly possible to be so screwed that recovery is unlikely. It's also possible to overestimate those deficits and the resulting screwage, e.g. on account of depression. There's probably a nasty positive feedback loop where doing so makes getting unscrewed harder.
This is not exactly a reply to your question, but I think your question is fits this dynamic:
Miller's Iron Law of Iniquity
In principle, there is an evolutionary trade-off between any two positive traits. But in practice, every good trait correlates positively with every other good trait.
http://edge.org/response-detail/11314
Suddenly, I know the relative sizes of the planets!
HT Andrew Gelman.
ETA: Pluto isn't in the picture, but it would be a coriander seed, half the diameter of Mercury. For the Sun, imagine a spherical elephant.
The radius of the sun is only about ten times the radius of jupiter. I feel like a spherical elephant has considerably more than ten times the radius of a watermelon.
...is what I was about to say until I did research, and apparently it's pretty accurate. A watermelon can exceed 60cm diameter, and wolfram alpha gives an elephant's length between 5.4 and 7.5 metres.
That's either one huge grapefruit...or one tiny watermelon.
I thought this article about coaching in pickup techniques kind of misses the point:
I Took A Class on How to Pick Up Women—But I Learned More About Male Anxiety
http://www.alternet.org/culture/i-took-class-how-pick-women-i-learned-more-about-male-anxiety
I posted in response:
BTW, in case someone brings up the P-word, I'd like to know how seeing a prostitute will help a young man develop the skills he needs to get into sexual relationships through dating - because I just don't see the connection.
Seeing sex as less "magical" could help reduce tension with trying to get sex.
(By the way, the whole article seems to me like: "Look, some people have less social skills -- let's make fun of them! Oh, they are trying to overcome their weakness -- wow, that's even funnier!" The elephant in the room is that in our culture it is taboo to express empathy towards men and boys.)
Really? I do that all the time and literally nobody has ever tried to stop me or punish me for it. Do your actual personal experiences differ?
Dating and sex are related skills. I assume we agree a prostitute could give a good intro to sex. So why shouldn't she be a good dating coach too? The young man won't need to fear rejection from her, nor fear being talked about later, so they can role-play in emotional safety. She can still tell him what's going to cause rejection when he's not a customer, and what's going to work better. Best of all, she can lead all the way, past exchanging numbers and kissing all the way to sex etiquette.
Of course there's the drawback of possible shame over having visited a prostitute - but virginity can be a source of shame too. So I figure that for the median male adult virgin, seeing a prostitute would be net plus, especially if he manages to specifically ask for dating and first time sex roleplay.
(Posted using the anonymous community account; username and password are
Usernameandpassword)I hear that prostitutes who do that charge a lot -- more than typical 17-year-olds can easily afford, and low-end prostitutes basically just let you masturbate with their bodies.
Prostutites don't need a statutory rape charge any more than anybody else, so obviously I'm not talking about 17-year-olds. I mean guys of legal age.
Concerning economics, it's hard to compare. Here in Germany, prostitution is legal, the market is efficient, and there are lots of sex workers competent and professional enough to pull off what I described, available for 100-200 euros per hour. I imagine that in places where prostitution is illegal, the situation would be very different - especially if due to the threat of prosecution, potential customers can't simply email their needs and budget to a couple of providers to get a good offer...
(posted by another user using this account)
I'm not sure whether this is really a neutral coaching situation. For really independent sex-workers maybe. But I hear that many still work for a pimp, are highly motivated the extract high amounts from the yongster and wouldn't necessarily provide a neutral emotionally safe environment. This is from the source with significant (but possibly somewhat out-dated) work-experience in this field.
I wouldn't be too much concerned. The article is a lot less dismissive of PUA than what is usually put forward, even on this site. Plus, it's not that La Ruina isn't another little Mystery clone.
Based on what I know of my culture (US or other European countries might differ), not even 17 yo boys who do get girls know better. They usually get them because of a combination of some better looks, wider social circle, inferior opinions on women.
Those who apply for a PUA seminar are the ones who are trying to optimize their understanding of females, letting aside the fact that you cannot will yourself into being non-anxious. My opinion is that if they could be at ease around the opposite sex, they would wind up with a better sexual life than their "natural" peers.
Another post I made to this AlterNet piece:
There are a lot of quick success schemes sold with the same marketing that PUA products are sold. The fact that people are willing to pay money for a dream of quick success doesn't mean that they can deliver on the promise.
PUA is a quite complex topic.
Male anxiety is an issue, and I don't think that an expensive 3 to 4 day bootcamp normally fixes it. Neither does watching a 24 DVD set sold for 499$.
If I could either send a 18 year old to a tantra seminar or to a PUA seminar, I'm not sure that the PUA seminar is the one that gives the higher return as far as improving his success with the opposite sex.
The fact that you believe that might be the problem and illustrate lack of ability of dealing with women.
Tantra isn't really new-age exotic sex practices.
Wikipedia has little influence on what's practiced in a seminar with the headline tantra. At the same time of course it's not simply about the stereotype it has.
One element of tantra is for example strong eye contact. You can go to a PUA seminar and hear a lecture by a guy about holding eye contact. That often leads to guys going out and being uncalibrated. If you on the other hand learn eye contact in a tantra seminar the resulting behavior is likely much better calibrated.
I feel we are using the word "tantra" in entirely different meanings.
I speak about the kind of event that's titled a tantra seminar and take my knowledge of what happens there from people I meet in meatspace who took part in such events.
Well, what happens there?
That's a fair demand, but I don't want to go in too much detail on that point. There a lot of inferential distance in talking about New Age practices on LW and Tantra isn't a subject I studied deeply enough to be confident that I fully understand it's theory base.
Irrationality is an issue, and I don't think that reading the Sequences normally fixes it. Neither does a 3-day rationality seminar for $3900.
Still, for some people it's a good option.
I would expect different things working for different people.
The interesting thing is that the tantra seminar would not motivate people to write similar articles. Even if there is also no guarantee that it is something more than just someone's strategy to make money quickly.
I think most pickup coaches would object to this point of view, and it might make some of them quite unhappy. PUAs teach strategies that they believe will increase your attractiveness to the opposite sex. But it's silly to see attraction as a "weakness" or "vulnerability". Many people (women included, of course) want to feel attracted in the first place, especially to someone with other good qualities - they just don't get to make that choice most of the time! That's the one sense in which 'reduced agency' could be said to be relevant - but it doesn't negate the fact that agency really is quite heavily involved in any kind of pickup.
More along these lines by Dr. Helen Smith, the wife of blogger Glenn Reynolds, the Instapundit:
Geeks on Strike?
http://pjmedia.com/drhelen/2014/11/20/geeks-on-strike/
She references Vox Day's observations about how many young men these days find themselves alienated from young women, hence their willingness not to pull their punches when female social justice warriors start to mess with their gaming activities. What can these young women really do to these guys to punish them - withhold sex? They've already done that. Rejections have consequences.
I believe that it is a factor, it is far from being the only factor, probably not even the most important one. But it points in an interesting direction.
Okay, some political stuff here, because the topic is inherently political, and I even want to go one step more meta, which is deeper in politics:
Feminists have been complaining for a long time about traditional power structures in our society. Which is a legitimate complaint in my opinion, but I disagree with their choice of the word "patriarchy", because it has the unfortunate connotation that the traditional power structures are merely about something that (all? most? some?) men do to women, and so it makes us blind about things that some women do to men to maintain the traditional power structures. Suggesting that women as a group even have some kind of social power probably already is a heresy.
The list of the techniques women are traditionally allowed to use against men is here. They are mostly ad-homined arguments that a woman (for more powerful impact: a group of young women; but also their male defenders) can use against a man who tries to step out of the line.
"You are bitter!" "You hate women!" Because everyone is already primed to see men as dangerous and hateful. "You are afraid!" "Man up!" When convenient, the stereotypes of masculinity become a useful tool to shame men. "You are immature!" Grow up!" Again a reminder of failing the traditional role. "Stop whining!" "Your fragile male ego!" People have less empathy towards men, so remind them to not expect any. "You just can't get laid!" "You probably have a small penis!" Even this kind of argument is relatively accepted against men. It doesn't prove anything, it just suggests that the man is somehow defective, therefore low-status, therefore his opinions don't matter.
Each of these critiques makes more or less sense separately, but when we take them together, it becomes apparent that as a set they can be used in any situation. A man can be shamed for following his traditional gender role and for deviating from it. Maybe even both at the same time. Neither power nor weakness is acceptable. Perhaps, as a rule of thumb, a man should follow all his traditional obligations (get a job, make a lot of money, move all the heavy objects) but should not expect any traditional advantages (because that would be sexist). Even having a hobby is suspicious, unless the man can explain how the hobby will help him make more money in the future. In our culture, men have instrumental value; only women have terminal value. (Unless the man is really high-status, in which case different rules apply.)
So, in a way, if feminists complain about the traditional gender roles, they should celebrate gamers as allies, because those break the male stereotypes, and they do it on their own, no education or propaganda or change of laws necessary. But of course there is a difference between being a feminist in a sense "trying to change the traditional power structures (patriarchy)" and in a sense "cheering for the 'team women'". It's situations like this when the difference becomes visible; when weakening "patriarchy" also removes some systemic power from the "team women".
Equality comes at a price. The price is that you don't have servants anymore. If you complain about it, you probably didn't want equality in the near mode, only as a far-mode slogan.
From a proper point of view, gamers' resistance towards patriarchal shaming technuiques is an important victory of feminism. However, I would not be surprised if most self-identified feminists don't get it.
And what about women in gaming? Or gays, or asexuals? (Or course the official party line is that they don't exist.) All these people are now considered equal and respected members of the society... which includes the right to not give a fuck about what some young ladies are telling them to do.
Again, the true equality works both ways.
People underestimate the effect of the worst behaved people on their own side.
This being said, unless I've missed something (quite possible), feminists don't have a comparable history of doxing and violent threats.
You mean feminists in general, or just recent events?
EDIT: By the way, in the second link, the victim is a feminist, too.
Yeah, and you could throw in Erin Pizzey having been threatened for saying that a bit more than half the women in her domestic violence shelter were violent themselves.
Still, the list so far isn't comparable to the number of women who've been threatened just over GamerGate.
I'm at a huge risk of motivated thinking here, but I want to make a few points:
1) Not all forms of "threatening" are equal. For example killing someone's dog is much worse than sending someone a tweet "i hope you die". If we put these things in the same category, by such metric the latest tumblr debate may seem more violent than WW2. Also, the threats of blacklisting in an industry seem to me less serious, but also more credible than the threats of physical violence.
2) We have selective reporting here, often without verification. Journalists have a natural advantage at presenting their points of view in journals. Also, one side makes harrassment their central topic (and sometimes a source of income), while for the other side complaining about being harrassed is tangential to their goals. I haven't examimed the evidence, but seems to me there are almost no cases, on either side, where the threat is (a) documented, and (b) credibly linked to the opposing side, as opposed to a random troll, or some other unrelated conflict.
3) Lest we forget the parallel NotYourShield campaign, threats against gamers and game developers are technically also threats against women, and there are quite possibly more women in gamergate than in gaming journalism. Women are women even when they are not marching under the banner of feminism.
I could be wrong, but I thought the consensus was that your recent event example was not a dox of A by B (or only linking to a public dox by third party).
That said, it's very clear that A and B don't like each other and spin the facts unfavorably about each other.
Feminists do have a long history of doxing. My impression is that they don't make the same level of violent threats, but they certainly aren't rare. For example, Chloe Madeley.
Details about the history of doxxing?
<this is a political comment, usual mindkill caveats apply>
Here is a problem with an interest group:
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/03/05/3362801/nra-ivory-elephants-guns/
It's easy to hate the NRA if you come from certain parts. But the NRA is not very unusual in this respect. Interest groups, by their nature are unable to have the overview to know when to throw their cause under the bus for the "greater good." This is a general problem for all interest groups, regardless of whether their cause is noble or not.
The real question is how do we fight Moloch by a different method than competing interest groups (which will follow the usual "behavior physics" of interest groups, which feminism is not exempt from, regardless of how noble its goal is).
</political comment>
Like Lumifer, I think the NRA is doing the right thing here - even strictly from a conservationist perspective. If we all stopped eating eggs, would there be more chickens? Of course not. When I mentioned similar logic here at least the vegetarians were honest that they wanted to drastically reduce the chicken population. But if using fewer chicken products leads to fewer chickens, how will using fewer elephant products lead to more elephants? And note that these two contradictory answers are frequently pushed by the very same people.
If you really wanted to preserve elephant populations, you'd make it easier for people to farm them for their ivory, which would go, in part, into making gun handles. But because the NRA are culturally alien to you, you'd like to throw their cause under the bus "for the greater good," for the very slightest reason.
So yeah, we all want causes we don't care about to shut up and get out of our way. It's a good thing that we can't make them. After all, NRA members aren't just gun enthusiasts, they are also citizens in every other way. If NRA policy interferes too much with (say) economic wellbeing in the eyes of its members, then the NRA will lose force as an interest group.
I think maybe you do not realize how poor the institutions are here. There isn't some actor with long term overview maximizing ivory profits (and incidentally ensuring elephants continue as a species). Commercial overexploitation of resources in the biosphere is extremely common, and requires coordination to solve properly (see for example cod stocks collapse in the Atlantic for one example historically important for Europe). Collapse (the book) gave some examples where coordinating a long term exploitation of the environment was solved properly and examples where it wasn't.
But my point isn't about the NRA, or environmentalists specifically, I just used them as an example. My point is about a general problem with interest group ecosystems. If an interest group advocates a bridge to nowhere it is not going to lose force, it is doing precisely what it is meant to do.
I would like to add here that I have been very very careful not to discuss my actual politics. Most of your assumptions about my culture or my politics are false. (So I guess I passed the ideological Turing test?)
Back when I had long hair, I was once accosted by a dude trolling for Obama votes who said: "you have long hair, you must be an Obama supporter!" What you are doing is basically this. Filling a hole with a pigeon is going to be very frustrating for you in this case.
Not necessarily. An effective solution to the tragedy of the commons is property rights. While at the moment there may not be an actor with a long-term commercial interest in elephants, this kind of legislation is making sure that there never will be one.
I don't see a problem. Or, rather, I see a problem with the blanket prohibition on the sale of <100-year-old ivory as it looks unreasonable to me.
Gamers aren't "pulling their punches" online because SJW don't pull their punches either. It's all random Internet fun anyway until people actually get doxxed (or 'swatted', or worse).
I've long been convinced that donating all the income I can is the morally right thing to do. However, so far this has only taken the form of reduced consumption to save for donations down the road. Now that I have a level of savings I feel comfortable with and expect to start making more money next year, I no longer feel I have any excuse; I aim to start donating by the end of this year.
I’m increasingly convinced that existential risk reduction carries the largest expected value; however, I don’t feel like I have a good sense of where my donations would have the greatest impact. From what I have read, I am leaning towards movement building as the best instrumental goal, but I am far from sure. I’ll also mention that at this point I’m a bit skeptical that human ethics can be solved and then programmed into an FAI, but I also may be misunderstanding MIRI’s approach. I would hope that by increasing the focus on the existential risks of AI in elite/academic circles, more researchers could eventually begin pursuing a variety of possibilities for reducing AI risk.
At this point, I am primarily considering donating to FHI, CSER, MIRI or FLI, since they are ER focused. However, I am open to alternatives. What are others’ thoughts? Thanks a lot for the advice.
If you think general EA movement building is what makes the most sense currently, then funding the Centre for Effective Altruism (the people who run GWWC and 80k) is probably best.
If you think X-risk specific movement building is better, then CSER and FLI seem like they make the most sense to me: they're both very new, and spreading the ideas into new communities is very valuable.
(And congratulations on getting to where you're ready to start donating!)
Thanks.
At this point, I'm leaning towards CSER. Do you happen to know how it compares to other X-risk organizations in terms of room for more funding?
I don't know, sorry! Without someone like GiveWell looking into these groups individuals need to be doing a lot of research on their own. Write to them and ask? And then share back what you learn?
(Lack of vetting and the general difficulty of evaluating X-risk charities is part of why I'm currently not giving to any.)
An upper bound on the loss incured by waiting another year before you donate your savings to an organization is the interest they would have to pay on a loan of your saving's size in that time. If you estimate the chance that you will regret your choice of donation target in a year highly enough, that means waiting may be prudent. Just a thought.
(The cost might be increased by their reduced capacity for planning with the budget provided by you in mind; but with enough people acting like you, the impact of this factor should disappear in the law of large numbers)
Certainly that is an important point to consider. I could always place funds in a donor advised fund for now. However, if an organization that I donated to thought the funds would be best spent later, they could invest the funds. Considering this, my current thinking is that I should donate to an organization if they share the goal of reducing existential risk and I think they would be better at deciding on the best course of action than I would. Considering I am not currently an expert in areas which would prove useful to reducing existential risk, I'm leaning towards donating. Does this seem like a sensible course of action?
In practice, charities don't really invest excess money or take out loans to spend money sooner. I'm not sure why. Possible explanations:
Regardless, if you're thinking that your decision doesn't matter because the recipient can just do X or Y, and it turns out X and Y aren't really options for them, then your decision does still matter.
This week's writing lesson: If your motivation for writing is almost entirely internal, then you should write what you enjoy writing, not what you think you should write.
(I lost a few days' worth of productivity getting that one knocked into my skull, though hopefully I'm back to snuff.)
Has anyone been prompted to study or read anything thanks to MIRI's new research guide?
What does your inner Quirrellmort tell you?
Has your internal model of the most competent person you can imagine ever given you an insight you wouldn't have thought of with more traditional methods?
Do you have more than one such useful sub-personality?
Does your main mode of thinking bring anything to the table that your useful mental models of others don't? If so, what?
I unfortunately haven't developed a quirrellmort yet (the concept is on my to-do list though, along with a number of other personifications). I do have two loose internal models though, for very specific tasks.
The first is called "The Alien" or just "Alien". I created it in my mid-teens after reading the last samurai (not the movie), although my use of The Alien is not the same as the book's. The Alien is the voice in my head that says the pointlessly stupid or cruel things (generally about people) for no reason other than being able to. They aren't things I actually believe or feel, so I just tell The Alien to shut up. By doing this, I can create a divide between myself and these thoughts, not feel guilty about them occuring, and more quickly put them out of my mind.
The second I created very recently based off this thread. It is for the prevention of ego depletion when it comes to either starting big tasks or taking care of long lists of little tasks. Rather than think "Ok time to (make myself) do this" I defer the choice to an internal, slightly more rational model of myself that doesn't suffer from decision fatigue. The outcome is very predictable ("Do the goddarn task already"), but does seem to work very well for me. It's still quite new, and I probably don't use it as much as I should.
I have plans to make a number of other internal models to create an internal 'parliment' that can discuss and debate major decisions, or act on their own for specific required benefits. Other models that might be included include a cynic/pessimist (to help me be more pessimistic in my planning), an altruist (to consider if my actions are actually beneficial), a highly motivated being (to help renew my resolve), and some kind of quirrellmort. These are probably very liable to change as I try to implement them.
He mostly tells me to kill annoying people.
No, but I'm working on them. I've found my inner Hufflepuff to be particularly helpful in actually getting things done.
Incidentally, is there a name for the "sub-personality technique?"
'Deliberately induced dissociative identity disorder'?
'Cultivation of tulpas'?
'Acting'?
What would Jesus do?
Adopting a hero.
Short Duration Personal Saviour.
Method acting.
Internal Family Systems is the analogous therapy technique, I think.
This already refers to a similar, but much dicier, technique.
An idea I've been toying with in my head, and discussed slightly at LW London yesterday: a sort of Snopes for "has person X professed opinion Y?"
Has Scott Alexander endorsed GamerGate? Did Eric Raymond say that hackers tend to be libertarian (or neoconservative, depending who you ask)? Did Eliezer say the singularity was too close to bother getting a degree?
I'll put further thoughts in replies to this comment.
I'd be wary of making a thing like that. Even ignoring the EU's bizarre "Right to be forgotten" law, people should be allowed to change their opinion, and such a website would incentivise consistency only. Not truth; consistency.
Are you sure that's what you want?
Mm, good point.
One of the things which inspired this idea was this thread: "okay, yes, it seems that Eliezer might well have said something like that, back in 2001". Eliezer already doesn't get to be forgotten. But if people are attacking him for things he said back in 2001, it seems like an improvement if we make it obvious that he said them back in 2001.
But for other people, I can see how this could be a bad thing to have. I'd like to be able to write "they said this in 2001, but in 2010 they said the opposite" and have people accept "okay, they changed their mind", but that doesn't seem entirely realistic.
I've updated from "probably good idea, unsure how valuable" to "possibly good idea, high variance".
Ideally it would have "he said it", "he did not say it", and "he has since retracted it". As is, you could find where someone originally said something, and have no way of knowing if it has ever been retracted.
I assume you're talking about internet figures in the greater LW-memeplex. If so, I think this is a bad idea.
Tidy reasons this may have low-to-moderate value:
Messy reasons this might have negative value:
I'm not intending it to be LW-focused at all (except perhaps by accident of userbase). Other public figures I recall seeing misrepresented include Eric S Raymond, Orson Scott Card and Larry Summers.
I've read enough ESR that when RationalWiki says
I know that the blog post in question suggests that they really did perform a ritual for that purpose, and that the ritual had a significant effect on the mental state of the participants, but ESR does not believe that the ritual was effective in summoning any kind of god. The blog post doesn't make that last part explicit, but if pressed I could find a slashdot comment where he does say so explicitly.
I don't think it's easy to do this.
(The RW line could be considered not-completely-false, because one can summon a god without the god answering. And it might even be honest, if the writer didn't understand where ESR was coming from. But to the extent that people read it and think that ESR believes that Ogun was successfully summoned, that line isn't true.)
I'm also not interested in arguing over whether or not that ritual ever took place. I don't think anyone's particularly interested in that. I think some people are interested in making fun of ESR, and I'm interested in making it as easy as possible to debunk those people when they say things that aren't true. So I don't need to present ESR's arguments, I just want to say "no, you're misrepresenting his conclusions".
The list of misrepresented public figures is the list of public figures.
As far as famous/notable people go, skeptics.stackexchange works perfectly well for those questions.
In general however focusing on "he said, she said" is bad. I might argue I wide arrange of positions depending on the context. Sometimes I play devils advocate to make points.
Focusing on actual content instead of focusing on what someone said in a single instance if often better.
The answers to questions like this aren't necessarily "yes" or "no". But it could still be valuable to say things like "the source for this seems to be this article from 2004, in which he is quoted as saying ...." Or, "he was quoted as saying this in this article. He encouraged people to read the article, but years later, he said that that line was a misquote."
That's pretty much how TakeOnIt works already.
That seems pretty similar to what I'm envisioning, but transposed. They want to look at positions, and ask "whose opinions on this position are notable?" where notability is based on whether they're likely to have a clue. I'm going for looking at people, and asking "which of this person's positions are notable?" where notability is based on (something like) whether people are talking about it being their position.
That's just the default view. You can click on the name of any "expert" and bring up a nice report where all of their positions are listed and compared with other experts'.
And "notability" is viewed quite generally anyway. As long as the person has something genuinely worthwhile to say, you can add their opinion on all sorts of stuff.
The fact that I recommend people to read an article in which I'm cited doesn't imply that I believe that the article is 100% factually correct.
In general journalists do simply the positions of the people they quote. Depending on the context I might be okay with a slight alteration of my position in the article as long as the main points I want to make appear in the article. If the quote then gets lifted into another context, I might have a problem.
There are a lot of true claims of the form "person X said thing Y". It would be a mistake to only include false claims, because then a claim which isn't listed may be considered true by default. But including every claim would make it impossible to find the one someone is interested in. I'm not sure what notability guidelines would look like.
I'm envisioning this as a mediawiki, where a given person will have a page, and that page lists claims about things they have said. Edit wars can hopefully be fixed by having a number of editors who know how to be impartial, and being trigger-happy on locking pages so that only they can edit. The talk page can be used for discussion, and for the person themselves to weigh in.
The year is 1800. You want to reduce existential-risk. What do you do?
Are you a time-traveler or a native?
A native (but optionally a very insightful and visionary native).
EDIT: I said native, but all that I really want to avoid is an answer like "I would use all my detailed 21-st century scientific knowledge to do something that a native couldn't possibly do".
How about "I would use all my detailed 21-st century scientific knowledge to be concerned about something that a native couldn't possibly be concerned about"?
Well, being concerned about existential risk in 1800 probably means you were very much impressed by Thomas Malthus' An Essay on the Principle of Population (published in 1798) and were focused on population issues.
Of course, if you were a proper Christian you wouldn't worry too much about X-risk anyway -- first, it's God's will, and second, God already promised an end to this whole life: the Judgement Day.
Still true today.
Sure, but the percentage of fully believing Christians was much higher in 1800.
Start an insurance company with a focus on risk mitigation.
(Amass resources, collect information, you get the idea.)
Many Interacting Worlds: Boffo or Bunk?
From my blogfeed: http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/the-many-interacting-worlds-hypothesis/ , which links to http://www.nature.com/news/a-quantum-world-arising-from-many-ordinary-ones-1.16213 , which links to http://journals.aps.org/prx/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevX.4.041013 .
Does anyone with a better understanding of Schrodinger's Equation(s) than I know if any of the above is worth paying attention to?
It's interesting, but I wouldn't be much concerned with models that "reproduce some generic quantum phoenomena".
Thanks to categorical quantum mechanics, we already know that many finite toy models do that: heck, you can have quantum phoenomena in databases.
I had a similar prompt for knowledge seeking in wanting to figure out how the math supports or doesn't support "converging worlds" or "mangled worlds". The notion of a converging world is also porbably of note worthy intuitive reference point in thought-space. You could have a system that is in a quantum indeterministic state each state have a different interaction so that the futures of the states are identical. At that point you can drop the distinguising of the worlds and just say that two worlds have become one. Now there is a possibility that a state left alone first splits and then converges or that it does both at the same time. There would be middle part that would not be being able to be "classified" which in these theories would be represented by two worlds in different configurations (and waves in more traditional models).
Some times I have stumbled upon an argument that if many worlds creates extra worlds whether that forms as a kind of growing block ontology (such as the flat splitters in the sequence post). Well if the worlds also converge that could keep the amount of "ontology stuff" constant or able to vary in both directions.
I stumbled upon that |psi(x)^2| was how you calculated the evolution of a quantum state which was like taking a second power and then essentailly taking a square root by only careing about the magnitude and not the phase of the complex value. For a double slit wtih L being left and R being R it resulted in P(L+R)^2= <L|L>^2+C<L|R><R|L>+<R|R>^2 (where C was either 1, 2 or sqr(2) don't remember and didn't understand which) . The squarings in the sum I found was claimed to be the classical equivalent of the two options. The interference fridges would be great and appear where the middle term was strong. I also that you could read <x|y> as something like "obtain X if situation was/is y". Getting L when the particle went L is thus very ordinary and all. You can also note that the squaring have the same form as the evolution of a pure state. However I didn't find anything in whether the middle term was interpretable or not. If you try to put it into words it looks a lot like "probability of getting L when the situation was R" which seems very surprising that it could be anything else than zero. But then again I dont' know what imaginary protoprobabilties are. Because it's a multipication of two "chains of events" it's clear you can't single out the "responcible party", it can be a contribution from both. I somehow suspect that this correlates that if your "base" is |L> then the |R>|L> base doesn't apply, ie you can't know the path taken and still get interference. I get that many worlds posits the R world and the L word but it seems there is like a bizarre combination world also involved. One way I in my brute naivity think migth be goign on is taht the particle started in the L world but then "crossed over" to the R world. If worlds in contact can exchange particles it might seem as particles "mysteriously jumped" while the jumping would be loosely related where the particle was. They would have continous trajectories when tracked within the multiverse but they get confused for each other in the single worlds.
However I was unable to grasp the intuition how bras and kets work or what they mean. I pushed the strangeness to wavefunctions but was unable to reach my goal.
It still seems mysterious to me how the single photon state turns into two distinct L and R. I could imagine the starting state to "do a full loop" be a kind of spiral where the direction that photon is travelling is a superpositon of it travelloing in each particular direction with each direction differing from it's neighbour by the phase of the protoprobability phase with their magnitudes summing to 1. That way if the photon has probability one at L it can't have probability 1 as the real part of the protoprobability at R can't be 1 as it is known to differ in phase. I know these intuitions are not well founded, I know the construction of them is known to be unsafe. However intuitive pictures are more easy for me to work with even if it means needing to reimagine them rather than just have them in the right configuration (if somebody know s a more representative way to think about it please tip me about it).
I am also using a kind of guess that you can take a protoprobaility strip it of imaginary parts an dyou get a "single world view" and I am using a view of having 2 time dimensions: a second additional clock makes the phases of the complex values sweep forward (or sweep equal surface areas) even if the "ordinary clock time" would stay still. The undeterminancy under this time would be that a being that is not able to measure the meta-time would be ignorant on what part of the cycle the world is in. Thus you would be ignorant of the phases, but the phases would "resonate". I am assuming one could turn this into a equivalent view where the imaginary component would just select a spatial world in a 1-time multiverse (in otherwise totally real-part only worlds).
I don't have known better understanding but I have a bunch of different understadnings of unknown fittness.
I don't quite understand this topic, but maybe this could be useful:
The problem with "converging / mangled worlds" is statistical. To make two worlds interact (and become the same world, or erase each other, depending on mutual orientation of their amplitudes), those worlds must have all their particles in the same position. In usual circumstances, this seems unlikely. Imagine the experiment with the cat, where in one world the cat is dead, and in other world the cat happily walks away. How likely is it that at some moment in the future, both universes will have all particles in the same positions?
So, in usual circumstances two worlds interact only if a moment ago they were the same world, and the only difference was one particle going two different paths. (Yes, there are also all the other particles in the universe, also splitting all the time. But this happens the same way in both branches, so it cancels out.)
My intuition is that this "single state" was never literally one point, but always a small interval (wave? hump?). An interval can break into two parts, and those can travel in different directions. There is no such thing as a single point in quantum physics.
(Disclaimer: I don't really understand quantum physics; I am just interpreting the impression I got from looking at Eliezer's drawings. If you have better knowledge, feel free to ignore this.)
What forces the worlds to be same in order to interact? You could also have merely adjacent worlds where the "collisions angle" could compensate for small differences. It is just a little harder to imagine how worlds of unrelated state would interact. Maybe dark energy is the sum total of gravity from other worlds?
It's also that two worlds won't long stay singular, but branch all the time into subworlds. The probability of some of the pairwise worlds being close enough is higher.
edit: Also there are settings where splitting doesn't mean lack of structure. For example in the mirror experiements the two paths will systematically intersect and this is a pretty stable result of the mirror positionings.
This doesn't seem to give a straightforward explanation for whether it could reproduce the expected Bell-type experiments, especially a CHSH experiment, and from a glance I don't see how they'll get that correct without forcing some sort of completely ad-hoc rule for how the universes interact.
It's an appealing and easy enough hack that I'll plug my recent LessWrong discussion post Shop for Charity: how to earn proven charities 5% of your Amazon spending in commission. Especially now that Black Friday week has started on Amazon.
On the same topic, Gunnar_Zarncke recently started a LessWrong Financial Effectiveness Repository
That is a neat hack - who said there's no such thing as a free lunch?
This isn't necessarily- if you have to think about using that link as charity while shopping, it could decrease your likelihood of doing other charitable things (which is why you should set up a redirect so you don't have to think about it, and you always use it every time!)
Amazon already does that for you -- if you go to buy something without using that link, it'll ask you if you want to.
We're considering Meetup.com for the Tel Aviv LW group. (Also, the question was asked here.) It costs money, but we'd pay if it's worthwhile. I note that there are only 5 LessWrong groups at Meetup of which 2-3 are active. I'll appreciate feedback on the usefulness of Meetup.
I am considering deleting all of my comments on Less Wrong (or, for comments I can't delete because they've been replied to, editing them to replace their text with a full stop and retracting them) and then deleting my account. Is there an easier way of doing that than by hand?
(In case you're wondering, that's because thanks to Randall Munroe the probability that any given person I know in meatspace will read my comments on Less Wrong just jumped up by orders of magnitude.)
I have been convinced that deleting my comments would be overkill, so I'm going to just delete my account, which will anonymize my comments, and hope that the permalink page title bug will be fixed.
I might come back here with a different username later.
Thanks to Baughn for their offered help.
Have a nice day.
You could try changing your username. I am not sure whether it would change the username that appears on all your past comments, but I suspect it would. You could email and ask.
Keep in mind that you can delete posts from LW, but you can't delete things from internet archives.
I account hop a lot, and also would like to know if anyone knows.
Will you be making a new account that will be even less tied to you, or will you stop posting on LW?
I probably will. I might also create an account under my full name which I will only use for things I'm (100 - epsilon)% sure I wouldn't mind anyone reading.
Do you really think that who you are in meatspace is possible to identify from reading a few LW posts?
I think if you are worried I would simply remove references to your location.
I would also think that it's likely that you overrate the cost of people knowing you participate on LW.
My username is formed by a shortening (though not one I often go by) of my real first name and my real birth year, and I've used it elsewhere, including in my main non-work e-mail address; so anyone who knows my e-mail would at least suspect that this LW account is mine.
(I first picked this username when I was 14 and kept using it everywhere out of habit.)
afaic, 99% of the people you meet in meat space don't read very much, let alone go through archives of anonymous forums. Internet trolls, on the other hand..
The percentage of people in meatspace who would throw an email handle into Google is rather large.
A Google search for his username has his LW account as the third hit (after the two Wikipedia hits).
You might perhaps like to edit out the username from this comment now.
Aha, thanks.
Google searches aren't ideal for this sort of thing, because your google results are tailored to you personally. Using DuckDuckGo, which shows the same search results to everyone, is probably a bit more reliable for these purposes (although in this case it gets the same results).
Not in my case. I take countermeasures to Google tracking.
Suppose that identification through writing habits gets a lot cheaper and easier.
The cost might be fairly low among people who are even vaguely reasonable. The risk of attracting a mob is low, but the cost is non-trivial.
The cost very much depends on whether you are employed in a antifragile way or a fragile way.
There's more to life than one's employment-- some mobs also go after their target's relatives.
Also, a fairly high proportion of people get highly distracted and upset by violent threats even if the likelihood of physical attacks has been low so far.
How many of said threats are not bluffs? I mean, I know that some of them aren't, but I can't get myself to alieve it.
So far as I know, these threats are quite common, but I haven't heard of any physical action being taken on them.
If you haven't been on the receiving end of such threats, you may be underestimating the way you'd react to them.
One thing people report is that they get frightened because there are people putting in a notable amount of effort to make them feel bad.
I'm not really aware of that happening as a result of internet disputes.
A high proportion of people also don't draw mobs.
I know one person who did and he has no issue dealing with it.
Given that you are a woman I can understand that it's a more reasonable risk for you. Unfortunately online women get attacked more easily and more nasty than a lot of men.
Still you have chosen to be quite open.
I've chosen to be open because it feels like the right thing for me to do. I have no idea whether I'm taking an excessive risk.
What I've heard is that men are more likely to get attacked (makes sense given where they hang out), it's just that women are more likely to make a big deal of it.
?! But your name seems even less tractable to yourself than mine is, and I don't worry about that!
(also, if you take into account the probability that they will link those comments to you, and that they will think badly of you because of it, no?)
Why not use your real name and own what you write?
This certainly isn't a safe option for everyone.
Markus Ramikin's Semimonthly Dumb Question time. Since we seem to have both experts on physics and on editing wikipedia:
What do you think of the quality of the current Wikipedia article on heat death? Is it a fair treatment?
I keep seeing intelligent people talk about this concept like it's obviously useful and relevant, and to my layman mind it is, but the article sounds a little like it's basically bunk now, with the opening summary ending this way:
The style, and the way these words are repeated verbatim down the page, makes me suspect the work of a single editor with strong opinions, and so I wonder. Just because of definition problems?
(I'll admit my proximate reason for asking is kinda trivial: the claim sometimes comes up in Madoka fandom that appreciating Kyubey's agenda requires trusting his civilisation's greater understanding of physics, and I wanna say that no, the show isn't making it up, that life ultimately running out of fuel is an idea that we humans have been considering seriously. But if I should mention "heat death" to someone who doesn't know what it is, and they look it up and see that, the first thing they'll say is "well this is disproven and there's nothing to worry about").
There is no reason, other than happy cultural accident, for any given Wikipedia article on a technical topic to be good. Technical subjects I know something about are generally treated very poorly. Wikipedia has no incentives in place for experts to correct things, and for non-experts to shut up.
When did you get this impression? I'm only asking because I'm given to believe that the situation on wikipedia with regards to experts and specialized subjects has improved substantially starting in about 2008 or so(?), at least in the humanities but possibly in other fields.
This was in fact prior to 2008 (my advisor asked me to change something in the Bayesian network article, and I got into a slight edit war with the resident bridge troll who knew a lot less than me, but had more time and whose first reflex was to just blindly undo any edits. These sorts of issues with Wikipedia are very well documented).
The horrible article on confounders is another good example. I brought it up before here, and got the "that's like, your opinion" kind of reply. At least they cite Tyler's paper with me now! Of course, this particular case might be more widespread than just Wikipedia, and might be a general confusion in statistics as a field. I went to a talk last week where someone just got this wrong in their talk (and presumably in their research).
I don't doubt that there are isolated communities within Wikipedia that generate good content. For example, I know there are Wikipedia articles for some areas of mathematics of shockingly high quality. My point is, when this happens it is a sort of happy cultural accident that is happening in spite of, not because of, the Wikipedia editing model.
There has been quite a bit of experimentation online to incentivize experts to talk and non-experts to shut up, recently. I think that's great!
Wikipedia is more comprehensive now than in 2008, but I speculate that its average article quality might be lower, because of (1) competent editors being spread more thinly, and (2) the gradual entrenchment of a hierarchy of Wikipedia bureaucrats who compensate for a lack of expertise with pedantry and rules lawyering.
(I may be being unfair here? I'm going by faint memories of articles I've read, and my mental stereotype of Wikipedia, which I haven't edited regularly in years.)
Average article quality is almost certainly going down, but the main driving force is probably mass-creation of stub articles about villages in Eastern Europe, plant genera, etc. Of course, editors are probably spread mpre thinly even among important topics as well. A lot of people seem to place the blame for any and all of Wikipedia's problems on bureaucracy, but as a regular editor such criticisms often seem foreign, like they're talking about a totally different website. True, there's a lot of formalities, but they're mostly invisible, and a reasonably intelligent person can probably pick up the important customs quite quickly. In the past 6 months of relatively regular editing, I can't say I remember ever interacting involuntarily with any kind of bureaucratic process or individual (I occasionally putter around the deletion nominations for fun, but that's just to satisfy my need for conflict). Writing an article (for example), especially if it's any good, is virtually never going to get you ensnared in some kind of Kafkaesque editorial process. Such things seem to operate mainly for the benefit of people who enjoy inflicting such things on each other (e.g., descending hierarchies of committees for dealing with mod drama).
It's late, so hopefully the above makes some modicum of sense.
The fact that Max Planck is a respected authority can't be easily disproved and he's cited.
On the other hand he did write that more than 100 years ago.
The introductory section doesn't contain any modern physics but 19th century views. If you would gather more modern sources, you might use them to update the article.
If there is a future Great Filter, it seems likely it would be one of two things:
1) a science experiment that destroys the world even though there was no reason to think that it would.
2) something analogous to nuclear weapons except easily constructable by an individual using easily obtainable materials, so that as soon as people have the knowledge, any random person can inflict immense destruction.
Are there any strategies that would guard against these possibilities?
I will donate N dollars to an x-risk organization within the next month. I tried to check what the effective altruism site recommended, but it required an email address. What organization should I donate to?
(N is predefined, and donating to the organization must not take longer than a standard online purchase.)
This is really worrying. Hubris and irrational geopolitical competition may create existential risks sooner then expected. http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-the-pentagons-skynet-would-automate-war
Weird fictional theoritical scenario. Comments solicited.
In the future, mankind has become super successful. We have overcome our base instincts and have basically got our shit together. We are no longer in thrall to Azathoth (Evolution) or Mammon (Capitalism).
We meet an alien race, who are way more powerful than us and they show their values and see ours. We seek to cooperate on the prisoner's dilemma, but they defect. In our dying gasps, one of us asks them "We thought you were rational. WHY?..."
They reply " We follow a version of your meta-golden rule. Treat your inferiors as you would like to be treated by your superiors. In your treatment of super intelligences that were alive amongst you, the ones you call Azathoth and Mammon, we see that you really crushed them. I mean, you smashed them to the ground and then ran a road roller, twice. I am pretty certain you cooperated with us only because you were afraid. We do to you what you did to them"
What do we do if we could anticipate this scenario? Is it too absurd? Is the idea of extending our "empathy" to the impersonal forces that govern our life too much? What if the aliens simply don't see it that way?
Evolution is powerful, but that doesn't make it an intelligence, certainly not a superintelligence. We're not defecting against evolution, evolution just doesn't/can't play PD in the first place. But I'm also not sure how important the PD game is to this scenario, as opposed to the aliens just crushing us directly.
And as long as we're personifying evolution, an argument could be made that the triumph of human civilization would still be a win for evolution's "values", like survival and unlimited reproduction.
I don't understand how this rule leads to the described behavior. As written, it suggests that the aliens would like to be crushed by their superiors...?
The whole scenario depends on a reification fallacy. You don't negotiate with, or engage in prediction theory games with, impersonal forces (and calling capitalism a force of nature seems a stretch to me).
That's not how TDT works.
Is TDT accurately described by "CDT + acausal comunication through mutual emulation"?
I view TDT as a bit unnatural, UDT is more natural to me (after people explained TDT and UDT to me).
I think of UDT as a decision theory of 'counterfactually equitable rational precommitment' (?controversial phrasing?).
So you (or all counterfactual "you"s) precommit in advance to do the [optimal thing], and this [optimal thing] is defined in such a way as to not give preferential treatment to any specific counterfactual version of you. This is vague. Unfortunately the project to make this less vague is of paper length.
:)
Folks working on UDT, feel free to chime in to correct me if any of above is false.
But isn't UDT relying on perfect information about the problem at hand?
If this is so, could it be seen as the limit of TDT with complete information?
Communication isn't enough. CDT agents can't cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma if you put them in the same room and let them talk to each other. They aren't going to be able to cooperate in analogous trades across time no matter how much acausal 'communicaiton' they have.
Similar "problem"(?): Acausal trade with Azathoth
Deification of natural forces is a standard human culture trait. A large proportion of early gods just personified natural phenomena.
Shinto is a contemporary religion that still does that a lot.