If your preferences about possible states of the world follow a few very reasonable constraints, then (somewhat surprisingly) your preferences can be modeled by a utility function. An agent with a reasonably coherent set of preferences can be talked about as if it optimizes a utility function, even if that's not the way it was programmed. See VNM rationality.
I agree with this, but that doesn't mean the model has to be useful. For example you could say that I have a utility function that assigns a utility of 1 to all the actions I actually take, and a utility of 0 to all the actions that I don't. But this would be similar to saying that you could make a giant look-up table which would be a model of my responses in conversation. Nonetheless, if you attempt to program an AI with a GLUT for conversation, it will not do well at all in conversation, and if you attempt to program an AI with the above model of human b...
Edge.org has recently been discussing "the myth of AI". Unfortunately, although Superintelligence is cited in the opening, most of the participants don't seem to have looked into Bostrom's arguments. (Luke has written a brief response to some of the misunderstandings Pinker and others exhibit.) The most interesting comment is Stuart Russell's, at the very bottom:
I'd quibble with a point or two, but this strikes me as an extraordinarily good introduction to the issue. I hope it gets reposted somewhere it can stand on its own.
Russell has previously written on this topic in Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach and the essays "The long-term future of AI," "Transcending complacency on superintelligent machines," and "An AI researcher enjoys watching his own execution." He's also been interviewed by GiveWell.