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Fluttershy comments on Integral versus differential ethics - Less Wrong Discussion

9 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 01 December 2014 06:04PM

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Comment author: Fluttershy 01 December 2014 07:33:17PM *  3 points [-]

People who don't object to the way in which the problem leading to the "repugnant conclusion" is set up, and who accept that B is preferable or equal to B-, which is preferable or equal to A+, which is preferable or equal to A, as defined here, must either accept that B is preferable or equal to A, or reject transitivity.

Most decision theories which would be viewed as sane around LW accept transitivity. I prefer A+ to B-, though, so I don't have to accept all forms of the "repugnant conclusion", even though I accept transitivity, and prefer A+ to A. I do agree that "For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living”, though-- I don't value the lives of people with high standards of living infinitely more than the lives of people with lives barely worth living.

Also see dust specks vs. torture.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 01 December 2014 08:15:47PM 0 points [-]

must either accept that B is preferable or equal to A

B versus A is whole class of B versus a whole class of A. You need but reject that once (while accepting it in most cases), and the mere addition paradox no longer does through.