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Stuart_Armstrong comments on Potential vs already existent people and aggregation - Less Wrong Discussion
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But it is. You can choose lower/higher numbers if you want. But the central point is that one problem aggregates (or can aggregate) in particular way, while the other doesn't.
For the reason I, and owencb, and Unknowns, and peter_hurford, have all given, there is a very big difference between the scenarios that at least on the face of it has nothing to do with aggregation.
Differences related specifically to aggregation may also be relevant, but I don't think this can be the right example to illustrate this because what it mostly illustrates is that for most of us a whole human life has a lot more moral weight than one millisecond of torture (assuming, again, that "one millisecond of torture" actually denotes anything meaningful).
You might want to consider either finding a different example, or explaining why it's a good example after all in some more convincing way than just saying "But it is".
See my edit: the purpose of this post is simply to show that there is a difference between certain reasoning for already existing and potential people. I don't argue that aggregation is the only difference, nor (in this post) that total utilitarianism for potential people is wrong.